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Abstract 
This project analyses perceived effects of the evolving Northern 
Powerhouse agenda on one of its major cities, Leeds. It utilises 
interviews with local elite actors and members of third sector and 
policy communities to examine perceptions of the Northern 
Powerhouse’s inception and impact. The project will further examine 
changing power dynamics between local and national government 
and private finance. This will be demonstrated by using classical 
power theories, particularly Steven Lukes’ third dimensional power, 
which allows for impositions of structures inimical to local power to 
receive reluctant acquiescence. Three key areas of devolution, 
administrative, political and financial are examined through the 
prism of Lukes’ theory. A perception of neo-liberal hegemony within 
local government is discussed and nascent opposition to this 
hegemony, redolent of overt conflict is evidenced. By using semi-
structured interviews with Leeds’ elite actors the project helps to fill 
an identified gap in scholarly knowledge of the Northern 
Powerhouse agenda.     
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Leeds, a Northern Powerhouse?: An Examination of 
changing power relationships in Leeds under the Northern 
Powerhouse agenda  
 
Introduction 
Following the 2010 General Election, the Conservative - led coalition 
government introduced a new ‘localism agenda’ (Nurse, 2015, p. 
690) which included reforms across the administrative, political and 
financial spectrum. This agenda was arguably given greater impetus 
in June 2014 when George Osborne, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, speaking in Manchester, stated: 
The powerhouse of London dominates more and 
more. And that’s not healthy for our economy. It’s 
not good for our country. We need a northern 
powerhouse too. 
(Osborne, 2014)  
As even the concept of a ‘North’ is difficult to define (Dorling, 2010), 
so too definitions of the Northern Powerhouse appear mutable to 
date (Nurse, 2015). The agenda behind the northern Powerhouse 
additionally appears to be centrally, rather than locally, directed 
(Lee, 2016; Giovannini, 2016), creating increased friction between 
central and local government (Giovannini, 2016).  
As one of the leading cities within the Northern Powerhouse, Leeds 
makes for an interesting case study for this thesis and helps 
illuminate discussions of power and regeneration inherent in the 
Northern Powerhouse agenda. Interviews were conducted from a 
broad range of actors within local elites and the broader political 
sphere within the city to examine their perceptions of current 
devolutionary plans and outcomes for Leeds. The perception 
emerges (see chapter 3) that Leeds has been dilatory in securing its 
participation in the scheme, unlike Manchester, for example, which 
has worked consistently with central government since the mid-
1980s (Blakeley and Evans, 2016). As the concept has evolved 
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some clarity has become apparent, with the appointment of a 
Minister for the Northern Powerhouse for example, but as Nurse 
contends, the Northern Powerhouse ‘raises more questions than it 
does answers’ (Nurse, 2015, p.696).  
This project located gaps within scholarly literature about the 
contemporary Northern Powerhouse agenda and its perception 
within local elites. Interview data around the Northern Powerhouse 
concept has not previously been undertaken in a similar context for 
Leeds. Previous scholarly research, with particular reference to 
theories of power, are utilised to produce a critical account informed 
by academic theory and research. The study’s theoretical framework 
is largely provided by Steven Lukes’ three dimensional view of 
power, outlined in Power: a Radical View (1974) and its’ revised 
second edition (2005). 
The project will contain four substantive chapters, each dealing with 
an integral aspect of the Northern Powerhouse agenda and its 
potential for changing power structures within Leeds, which is used 
as a case study in this project. The first chapter will examine 
perceptions of the Northern Powerhouse, its conceptual framework 
and implementation, allied to interviewees understanding of the 
opportunities and possibilities that the Northern Powerhouse 
agenda opens up. Discontent expressed by interviewees around the 
implementation, to date, of the agenda and the lack of local input is 
explored.  
Three important elements of the devolutionary agenda will be 
established and will form the remaining substantive chapters in this 
work. Firstly chapter 2 explores administrative devolution, 
particularly discussing the introduction of the City Region model and 
the replacement of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) by 
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and the reasoning behind this 
structural change. As both of these structural changes are 
considered to be centrally imposed, this will be examined in respect 
of the perceived rhetoric of localism promoted by successive 
governments. Secondly financial reforms and the perception of neo-
liberal economic models increasingly applying within Leeds and 
across Northern Powerhouse cities are explored. This third chapter 
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will also discuss City Deals in this context and discuss their effect on 
diminishing collectivist activity between cities and the promotion of 
market driven competition between Northern Powerhouse cities. 
There will further be an examination of transport infrastructure 
investment, particularly High Speed 2 (HS2) and its perception by 
interviewees in terms of regeneration of Leeds and the extent of 
local input into decisions on the project. The third chapter explores 
political devolution focusing on perceptions of power dynamics 
between local and national government and the City Mayor 
paradigm and its potential effect on power structures within City 
Regions. As City Mayors were rejected in previous referenda this 
indicates third dimensional power in action as a structure which had 
been rejected is imposed with little resistance. 
Third dimensional power described by Steven Lukes (1974; 2005) is 
evidenced across the Northern Powerhouse agenda and this theory 
is discussed in the literature review as it is integral to this project. 
This thesis will further examine how Lukes’ concept of conflict and 
non-conflict between elite actors is perceived and portrayed by 
elements within those elites. It has been argued that local elites 
have accepted the Northern Powerhouse agenda, and this fits with 
a reading of Lukes’ third dimension of power, however, evidence 
emerges from interview data that it hasn’t been accepted entirely 
without resistance. Additionally, potential areas of improvement for 
the Northern Powerhouse concept, such as an elected assembly to 
scrutinise the proposed City Mayors, will be examined and the 
reasoning behind these ambitions analysed.  
Comparisons will be drawn between Leeds and Manchester 
throughout the work, as this contrast consistently emerged in 
interview data. This comparison will give perspective to the single 
case study of Leeds and highlight the belief among local elites that 
Leeds is trailing Manchester in benefiting from devolutionary moves, 
as discussed in chapter 1. Primary data on Leeds will be used to 
inform academic research around power theories and illustrate 
discussions about third dimensional power and the nascent 
resistance to this that emerges from interview data. Data, gathered 
from a wide spectrum of opinion, allows for more informed 
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discussions around issues such as the posited, neo-liberal 
hegemony becoming established within cities such as Leeds, as 
advocated particularly, but not exclusively by participants on the left. 
It is argued by opponents of the Northern Powerhouse that current 
devolutionary plans are essentially rhetorical with the aim of further 
covert centralisation and a loss of power for local politicians to 
central government and private finance and these issues will 
additionally be examined. 
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Literature Review 
As power, and its possession and implementation, is the central 
theme in this project, this literature review focuses on work relating 
to the subject and will begin by examining the principal academic 
definitions and debates around power relevant to this project. It will 
explore paradigmatic works by Dahl (1957), Bachrach and Baratz 
(1962) and Stone (1989). Particular attention will be given to Steven 
Lukes’ Power: A Radical View (1974) and its 2nd Edition (2005) and 
their influential thinking around power structures and elements of 
conflict within these structures. To date, little academic research has 
been published specifically focusing on the Northern Powerhouse 
concept and its impact on a city such as Leeds, however academic 
literature on American urban power structures proved useful in 
formulating the research aims. The work of Blakeley and Evans 
(2013) on the regeneration of East Manchester has proved equally 
important as it has provided detailed work on a city considered 
comparable to Leeds by interviewees and covers similar ground in 
respect of regeneration and power.  
The literature review will examine scholarly research in three 
specific, linked areas, as these areas form the basis of the three 
thematic chapters in the thesis and provide theoretical 
underpinnings for the approach taken. Firstly, literature concerning 
administrative devolution and how reformed structures and their 
constitutions are defined in terms of power dynamics between local 
and national government and third sector actors. Secondly, it will 
engage with scholarship on fiscal devolution, analysing the debates 
concerning the extent of fiscal authority within local government and 
how successive national governments have arguably extended 
private sector finance into local government through legislation 
which is underpinned by a neo-liberal political ideology. Thirdly, this 
literature review will explore scholarship concerning political 
structural changes and outcomes for the devolution of power, 
examining political ideology and its effect on structures within local 
government. Within these examinations of potential power 
redistribution will be an investigation of current propositions for 
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directly elected City Mayors, exploring their ideological and empirical 
rationale as portrayed in academic literature. 
The capacity for proposed transport infrastructure investment to 
reinvigorate the Leeds City Regions economy will also be analysed. 
This will encompass an outline of current plans and a critical 
evaluation of academic research available, additionally identifying 
gaps within the subject literature. Financial outcomes and 
consequences for power relationships will be examined through this 
pivotal element of the Northern Powerhouse model.  
Classical Theories of Power 
The obvious place to begin this literature review is in 
conceptualising power and examining how power is held and 
exercised. Perhaps the simplest and arguably one of the more 
simplistic definitions is that proposed by Robert Dahl. In The 
Concept of Power (1957), based on studies of American local 
governance and power dynamics, Dahl describes the central tenet 
of power as, ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to 
do something that B would not otherwise do’ (Dahl, 1957, p.202-
203). However, Lukes (1974) characterises this definition as one- 
dimensional and concerned essentially with decision making and 
overt conflict.  Lukes further criticises Dahl for what he perceived as 
his behaviouralist, i.e. observable and quantifiable, focus and his 
consequent lack of theoretical underpinning. 
An arguably more nuanced definition of power came from Bachrach 
and Baratz in Two Faces of Power (1962). Introducing the idea of 
covert conflict as an integral component of power relationships, they 
describe how non-decision making i.e. the agenda control wielded 
by elites, is as important as overt decision making in any structural 
analysis of power. Utilising this agenda control allows elites to 
render certain issues inadmissible in public policy deliberations, thus 
isolating some sectors from power debates. This two dimensional 
theory has greater salience to this project as it encompasses a 
broader range of actors holding influence within the local elite 
sector, (as will be explored through primary data). It has, however, 
subsequently been criticised by McFarland (1969), Ricci (1972) and 
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Lukes (1974), as too functionalist i.e. concerned with elite stability 
based on public consensus without sufficient regard for conflict 
within power relations. 
Lukes further critiques this two dimensional view of power for its 
thinking around representative consensus. He characterises 
Bachrach and Baratz’s position as being ‘if people feel no 
grievances, then they have no interests that are harmed by the use 
of power’ (Lukes, 2005 p.28). However, Lukes believes that latent 
conflict undermines this consensus stating that ‘To assume that the 
absence of grievance equals genuine consensus is simply to rule 
out the possibility of false or manipulated consensus by definitional 
fiat’ (Lukes, 2005, p.28). Thus, Lukes arrives at a theory with echoes 
of the Marxist concept of false consciousness i.e. the poor and 
powerless do not understand or act in their own interests. Indeed 
Hay suggests that Lukes ‘draws implicitly on the work of the Italian 
Marxist, Antonio Gramsci’ (Hay, 2002 p.179) in describing the 
cultural hegemony that leads people to concern themselves with the 
private rather than the public sphere, allowing the bourgeoisie to 
control power without evident overt conflict. Lukes himself would 
prefer the label post-modernist, a claim supported by Heywood, who 
states that ‘Whereas Marxists associate power as thought 
control….postmodernist theorists come closer to seeing power as 
ubiquitous’ (Heywood, 2004. p.128. In the revised edition of  Power: 
a Radical View (2005) Lukes amends his position and delineates his 
definition of power into ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ which he argues 
is more significant. Morriss questions this assertion, however, 
believing that ‘Lukes is still convinced that ‘power over’ is the more 
important concept’ (Morriss, 2006 p.127).  
Lukes’ chief contribution to debates about power was his definition 
of a third face of power which identifies ideological power as 
pervasive because it allows for people’s objectives to be influenced 
by those who own power. This leads ‘dominated people to 
acquiesce and even celebrate their own domination’ (Dowding, 
2006, p.137). Haugard interprets Lukes concept of a third dimension 
of power as akin to the Gramscian concept of hegemony in which 
‘tacitly held shared interpretative horizons legitimate certain norms 
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and exclude others’ (Haugard, 2015, p.154). In his second edition of 
Power: a Radical View, Lukes describes this near paradoxical 
situation as: ‘one can consent to power and resent the mode of its 
exercise’ (Lukes, 2005, p148). Later chapters will show the 
importance of this paradox within local elite views of the Northern 
Powerhouse in relation to the Leeds City Region. 
Where Leeds is concerned, the concept of a pervasive power, 
whereby local government controls many aspects of local services 
and amenities, appears more redolent of historical administrations 
as the power of the City Council has steadily declined over time. 
Burt and Grady (1994), describe the diminution in power of Leeds 
City Council noting that at the tercentenary celebrations in 1926 the 
City Council had responsibility for town planning, transport and 
communications and all utilities with the Borough of Leeds calling 
itself the ‘Do-it-all Corporation’. Power held by Leeds local authority, 
however, has diminished, particularly since the late 1960s 
(Unsworth, 2004). This erosion of local power, indicative of the 
established theoretical developments in urban power structures 
which describe increasing centralisation, (Lowndes, 2002; Klug, 
2011) will be discussed further in subsequent chapters.  
Analysing power structures in Atlanta USA, Stones’ Urban Regime 
Theory (1989) has been widely used to examine power relationships 
within local government throughout the Western Liberal Democratic 
world, although Kevin Ward (1996) warns of the difficulties in 
translating this work to a non –American setting, particularly the UK. 
Stone uses the pluralist theories of Dahl (1957), in which outcomes 
are validated by competing actors, to analyse and interpret the real-
life working relationships between political, bureaucratic, business 
and civic actors. It also serves as a more empirical adjunct to post-
structuralist analysis by concentrating on real structures and 
institutions rather than what Kokkalainen (2011) terms historical 
interpretation i.e. a concentration on historical context and discourse 
interpretation.  
Stones’ typology, ‘focused on a stable pattern of cooperation 
observable in Atlanta across an extended time period, identifying 
mechanisms through which these arrangements were reproduced 
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over time’ (Rast, 2015, p.141), is generally regarded as outdated 
although retaining some function. For example, ‘the regime concept 
has helped encourage the shift away from a narrow focus on the 
formal institutions of elected government to an analysis that puts at 
its heart the social and economic setting in which Governments 
operate’ (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001, p.830). Davies (2002), 
critiquing Stone from a Gramscian perspective, argues that ‘it is the 
contradiction between liberalism and democracy that represents the 
core dialectic in society, not classes’ (Davies, 2002, p.4). So, as 
Elkin (1987) contends, society must be accountable to political 
decisions but must not interrupt individual liberty, particularly 
economic liberty. By introducing this element of capital within the 
regime it is argued that destructive tension is created ‘between 
business objectives and democratic demands’ (Davies, 2004, p.9), 
as local governments two core functions of representation and 
efficiency (Dollery, 2010) produce conflicting policies. However both 
Stone and Elkin believe that if Federal Government (in the USA) 
provides financial support for local government this insulates those 
regimes from business domination. This potential conflict between 
democracy and liberalism will be examined through the perceptions 
of local elite actors within Leeds’ power structure. 
Current Devolution of Power - Definitions 
Theorists have argued that political or administrative devolution is 
irrelevant, or certainly diminished, without proper fiscal devolution 
(Foreman-Peck and Lungu, 2009; Rummery and Greener, 2012). 
This fiscal devolution of public spending is considered ‘an 
appropriate response to heterogeneous political aspirations within 
current sovereign state boundaries’ (Foreman-Peck and Lungu, 
2009, p.825). Indeed as noted by Waite, MacLennan and 
O’Sullivan, (2013) greater local fiscal autonomy in an environment 
where resources are reduced, as has arguably been the case under 
the Coalition and Conservative Governments’ austerity agenda, is 
counter-intuitive. For some, (Ayres and Stafford, 2011; Rees and 
Lord, 2013), this is further evidence of the earlier thesis (Rhodes, 
1994) of a ‘hollowing out’ of Government whereby the illusion of 
increased devolution of power masks the diminution of local political 
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control and the greater involvement of external actors, particularly 
private finance. This ‘hollowing out’ notion has faced criticism with a 
counter claim that core executive capacity has been enhanced 
considerably (Holloway, 2000). Devolution of tax-raising powers 
appears to be currently off the agenda within England and Wales, 
although not in Scotland and Northern Ireland, implying the second 
face of power postulated by Lukes (2005) in which certain issues 
are removed from elite discussion in agenda setting debates.  
Consequently a greater emphasis is placed on specific spending 
powers, chiefly in the areas of Transport, Housing and Economic 
Development (Ayres and Stafford, 2011). The following chapters will 
examine these economic aspects of devolved power along with 
political and administrative elements of devolution. 
Some research on devolution has focused on ‘territorial politics’ 
which is concerned with centre/periphery relationships.  Perhaps the 
best definition of this is from Territory and Power in the United 
Kingdom (1983), by Jim Bulpitt, who describes  
That arena of political activity concerned with the 
relations between the central political institutions in the 
capital city and those interests, communities, political 
organisations and governmental bodies outside the 
central institutional complex, but within the accepted 
boundaries of the state, which possess, or are 
commonly perceived to possess, a significant 
geographical or local/regional character   
(Bulpitt, 1983, p.52) 
As power is paramount in all discussions of these centre- periphery 
relationships, this appears pertinent. Bradbury and Mitchell (2002), 
state that, ‘Before devolution territorial politics in the UK was 
strongly characterised by varying degrees of political instability’ 
(Bradbury and Mitchell, 2002, p.314). It seems that all political 
actors now accept that power should be distributed away from the 
centre, with Bradbury (2006) arguing that the positive effects and 
perceived wisdom of devolution of political power is one that cuts 
across political opinion. For example, citing Nairn (2000), he 
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characterises neo- Marxist opinion of regional identities as ‘benign 
and inclusive in contrast to the exclusive habits of the old nation 
states’ (Bradbury, 2006, p.564). Bradbury and Mitchell (2002) further 
describe the ‘normalisation’ of regional devolution within UK politics 
following the perceived success of Scottish and Welsh devolution 
(Hattersley, 2001; Bounds, Brown and Tighe, 2015). This discussion 
is relevant to this research as the impact of previous devolutions on 
Northern Powerhouse thinking will be explored through interviews 
with local elite actors in subsequent chapters.   
U.K. Local Government Administrative Structures   
Following the 2010 election, the Coalition Government instituted 
changes within local development agencies, replacing the 
established Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) with Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). Evaluation of RDAs has been 
ambivalent with Roberts and Benneworth (2001) noting a lack of 
independence, concluding ‘RDAs have a limited policy remit, they 
have been forced into a route of selecting choices from a menu of 
policies closely controlled by the centre’ (Roberts and Benneworth, 
2001, p.157). Conversely Gough (2003) found RDAs possessed 
considerable power but similarly questioned their legitimacy 
because of their lack of democratic accountability. 
Initial scholarly analysis seems to suggest a lukewarm reception for 
LEPs. They have been criticised for insufficient funding or financial 
control allied to a lack of public awareness and ‘clout’ (Philips, 
2010). Johnstone (2014) and Doyle (2013) argue they are prisoners 
of economic centralism and ill-thought out implementation, 
suggesting, apposite for this project, centralising tendencies in the 
model. The Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) found LEPs had 
an ‘important strategic role in supporting investment confidence and 
championing economic growth, especially through their spatial 
priorities, support programmes and other initiatives’ (RTPI, 2014) 
but that their role in planning lacked definition  and was subject to 
local discretion. Bentley, Bailey and Shutt (2010) believe LEPs have 
further seen a diminution of ‘regionalism’ as, contiguous with the 
abolition of RDAs, has been the abolition of Regional Spatial 
Strategies and Regional Economic Strategies with no direct 
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replacements. Conversely Deas et al. (2013) find that performance 
across LEPs is varied but in Leeds City Region a ‘process of several 
decades of building city-regional governance gives a potentially 
important advantage’ (Deas et al., 2013, p.733). 
City Regions: Administrative Changes 
The origins of City Regions are arguably found in the ‘Northern Way’ 
programme of former Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott in 2004 
(Rees and Lord, 2013) which attempted to create a proto- Northern 
Assembly by linking up the RDAs for Yorkshire, the North West and 
the North East of England. From a comparative aspect there are 
echoes here of the National Spatial Strategy launched in Ireland in 
2002 (Breathnach, 2013) which sought to balance development 
across the country through more effective and integrated planning 
and also revolved around the idea of hubs and gateways. Prescott’s 
initiative saw the creation of City Regions, including Leeds, to 
improve co-operation and communication between Metropolitan 
Councils centred on the ‘hub city’. The conceptualisation of Leeds 
as a ‘hub city’ is supported by its membership of the Core Cities 
Group (Smith and Wistrich, 2014), which describes itself as’ a 
unique and united local authority voice to promote the role of our 
cities in driving economic growth and the case for city devolution of 
major English Cities’ (Corecities.com, 2016). 
This Core Cities Group appears supportive of the City Region model 
stating that ‘Urban policy therefore needs to be framed within this 
city-region context rather than be simple focused on the problem 
areas within parts of the cities’ (Charles, Bradley, Chatterton, 
Coombes and Gillespie, 1999, p.2). The group called in 2014 for 
‘place-based settlements to form part of George Osborne’s 
‘Northern Powerhouse’ (Johnstone, 2014, p.6). Deas (2013) argues 
that City Regions have become the focus of regionalist policy as 
they are recognised by organisations such as the Urban Task Force 
and the Core Cities Group as being the drivers of national economic 
growth. However, Pugalis and Townend (2013) point out that many 
actors from political, business, and administrative sectors, in light of 
the abolition of RDAs, are aware LEPs and City Regions are 
potentially temporary models subject to change by national 
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government, although there is no current prospect of a change in 
government. This perceived impermanence and lack of power 
arguably undermines the effectiveness and status of LEPs. As will 
be seen in chapter 3, on financial devolution, the Leeds City Region 
LEP is considered successful, which is relevant to its effectiveness 
and perceived power. 
Funding Local Government: Neo-Liberal Economics ? 
George Lambie (2009) describes how the Fordist/Keynesian model, 
which attempts to match consumption and production (Roobeek, 
1987), and had existed since the Bretton Wood Conference of 1944, 
had begun to crumble from the late 1970s onwards (see also 
Dannreuther and Petit, 2006, Boyer, 2000). He states that ‘The 
hegemony of financial interests was enhanced by the election of 
sympathetic politicians such as Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 
the UK in 1979 and President Ronald Reagan in the United States 
in 1980’ (Lambie, 2009, p.161). This increased role for private 
finance and consequential reduced power for local politicians 
appears particularly salient to this project as financial control is 
fundamental to control of power (Forman- Peck and Lungu, 2009).  
O’Leary (1987) argues the neo-liberal approach of the Thatcher 
Government to local government emphasised ‘privatisation, 
performance indicators, contracting out and bureaucratic 
competition’, concluding that ‘Ideology legitimates decisions taken 
for other reasons’ (O’Leary, 1987, p.379-380). Additionally, ‘This 
was often imposed by Central government rather than freely chosen 
by public agencies- for example by the Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering (CCT) legislation of the Thatcher and Major 
administrations’ (Bovaird, 2006, p.440). Peck and Theodore (2012) 
describe the 2008 financial crisis as merely a stumbling block 
towards a more neo-liberal funding paradigm whereby local 
government displays elements of ‘neo-liberalisation of urban space 
and the recreation of the local state in ways which diminish the 
powers of local leadership’ (Newman, 2014, p. 3291). Newman 
however argues against the complete neo-liberal takeover of local 
government as ‘ideologies are never complete; they form crucial 
components of hegemonic projects but such projects are always in 
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the making rather than ‘won’ (Newman, 2014, p.3292), a theory 
echoed by Peck and Theodores (2012) ideas of opportunism and 
recalculations. Neo-liberalism is though, a highly contested concept, 
with Clarke (2008), for example, viewing it as promiscuous, 
omnipresent and omnipotent and therefore essentially as a label 
added to a policy ex post facto. This concept of neo-liberal 
hegemony within local government, imposed from the centre, is 
examined in subsequent chapters to analyse power dynamics 
between local and central government and private finance.  
Examining the outcome of the financial crisis of 2008 on Leeds 
Gonzalez and Oosterlynk view neo-liberalism as a ‘contingent and 
experimental process’ (Gonzalez and Oosterlynk, 2014, p.3175), as 
opposed to an implicit element in its post-crash economic difficulties. 
They further argue that City Deals have led to a ‘neo-liberal’ 
competition between cities for diminished central funding. This finds 
support from Harding (2007) who additionally describes an 
increasing emphasis on territorial competiveness apparent under 
the previous Labour Government. There is a further critique of the 
consensus of ‘an uncomplicated relationship between a neo-liberal 
polity and the academic logic of that neo-liberal hegemony’ (Rees 
and Lord, 2013, p.682), that is, neoclassical economics. They argue 
that ‘the political value of understanding functional geography can 
be seen to have emerged in the ‘golden era’ of Keynesian 
consensus and significantly pre-dates the emergence of neo-
liberalism’ (Rees and Lord, 2013, p.682-683).  
Hall (1993) describes ‘third order change’ in which neo-liberalism 
resulted in monetary policy replacing fiscal policy as the principal 
macroeconomic instrument. This change resulted in ‘political, as 
opposed to purely economic, criteria became the key factor behind 
the success of the monetarist paradigm’ (Hall, 1993, p.286), thus 
weakening the power of politicians at the expense of private finance. 
There is a counter-argument (Tomlinson, 2007), however, that 
Keynesianism didn’t die out in the 1970s and that the New Labour 
Government continued with such fiscal policies into the 21st Century 
evidenced by its commitment to full employment and increased 
public sector spending. Newman argues this changed under the 
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Austerity Agenda adopted following the 2010 election as the 
Conservative Party introduced a ‘neo-liberalising thrust’ (Newman, 
2014, p.3294). 
One of the main manifestations of an increased role for the private 
sector within local government funding and, more specifically, public 
sector procurement was the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), 
introduced by John Major in 1992 (Froud, 2003). Opinion of the 
scheme is deeply divided with a cost/benefit analysis said to indicate 
a small benefit to the public finances including an allowance for risk 
(Ball and King, 2006; Colman, 2000) a claim disputed by others 
(Heald, 2003; Bel, Brown and Marques, 2013). Central to this is the 
‘transfer of risk between the public and private sector’ (O’Boyle, 
2010, p.27). Both Wilks-Heeg (2009) and Parker (2013) however 
stress that New Labour Governments continued to extend the reach 
of private sector money in to the public sector.  
Subsequently, Ruane (2010) argues ‘They (PFIs) were not about 
whether powerful vested interests, such as big business, should be 
able to influence the direction and character of policy relating to 
public services in a democratic society but about whether some 
businesses might be offended by the representation of other 
businesses in strategic positions.’ (Ruane, 2010, p.537) Therefore 
debates around arguably the hegemonic funding position within 
much of national and local government, Ruane argues, were 
essentially between national politicians and business, with business 
increasingly holding the upper hand. This is evidenced in the Royal 
Armouries Museum in Leeds, one of the first PFI projects in the 
country. When the project failed financially, the private company 
behind it abrogated their responsibility and local government was 
left to fill the funding gap while the public sector took on all financial 
risks (National Audit Office, 2001). 
City Deals: Financial Re-organisations  
Following the Localism Act (2011) the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
George Osborne, outlined plans for new ‘City Deals’ initially for the 8 
largest Cities in England, including Leeds (Office of Deputy Prime 
Minister, 2013). This policy found support from the Centre for Cities 
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(2012), whose Chief Executive, Alexandra Jones, had critiqued 
previous legislation as producing powers that ‘have been somewhat 
fragmented’ and leading to a situation where ‘many national policies 
continue to be ‘spatially blind’ (Jones, 2012), that is seeing only 
‘things or objects’ rather than visions or demands. City Deals have 
however faced criticism about their legitimacy in respect of 
decentralising and devolution outcomes. Waite et al. (2013) state 
‘Many of the changes do not involve meaningful relaxation of central 
control, simply a reshaping that allows different roles to be played by 
businesses and municipal interests’ (Waite et al., 2013, p.775), a 
point supported by Jayne (2012) and Hambleton & Sweeting (2014).  
The mechanism of these City Deals stipulated that the City Regions 
themselves must initiate plans to negotiate with Central 
Government. These deals would give ‘each city new powers in 
exchange for greater responsibility to stimulate and support 
economic growth in their area’ (Deputy Prime Ministers Office, 29, 
April, 2013).  Some have argued that the focus on localism and City 
Deals is more indicative of ‘policy dumping’ (Waite et al., 2013; 
MacLennan & O’Sullivan, 2013), whereby a downward shift in policy 
control is mitigated by a reduction in resource support. Thus the 
apparent devolution of power is more likely to constitute ‘nominal 
autonomy rising while real power falls’ (MacLennan & O’Sullivan, 
2013). 
Transport Infrastructure Investment and Regeneration 
Governments consider transport investment vital as ‘Good transport 
has a key part to play in delivering the Northern Powerhouse. It 
creates an engine for growth’ (Transport for the North, 2015, p.15). 
Banister and Thurstain-Goodwin (2014) examine three different 
levels of impact to quantify the outcome, particularly on cost benefit 
analysis, of investment in rail transport. Firstly there are the macro 
economic effects, that is, the impact on economic growth for the 
region affected. Secondly they outline meso- economic effects, for 
example the impacts on agglomeration. This is a point echoed by 
Combes, Mayer and Thisse (2008) as they identify a ‘new economic 
geography’ which describes how transport improvements can lead 
to relocation of both business and consumers leading to an increase 
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in the size of agglomerations. Finally, they describe micro economic 
effects i.e. localised impacts particularly on land and property 
values.  
A further typology useful in examining transport infrastructure- led 
regeneration is the market/state dichotomy and the shifting dynamic 
within it. Allen (2001) brings together previous work (Donnison,1967; 
Castells,1977; Harloe, 1995) to locate the regeneration projects 
initiated under the New Labour Government on a three point scale 
from ‘dominant state’ to ‘dominant market’ (Allen, 2001, p.145). 
Allen further talks of a tendential drift from a Fordist, top down model 
to a Schumpeterian value system of supply side intervention and a 
subordination of public policy to the needs of market flexibility, 
which, from his perspective, exhibits ‘self- reliance, motivation and 
innovative flair’ (Allen, 2001, p.146). Endorsed by Hastings (1996) 
and (Preston, 2012), the trajectory, particularly under the Thatcher 
government, has been away from local authority control towards a 
more market orientated economy. However, as Gamble (1979) 
argues neo-liberalism’s prime approach is ‘not that it is against all 
state intervention but that it wants the state to intervene less in 
some areas and more in others’ (Gamble, 1979). 
At English city level there is less literature available on the benefits 
of investment in transport projects for regeneration. Perhaps the 
best examination is Blakeley and Evans’ (2013) investigation of the 
Metrolink systems ability to aid regeneration in East Manchester, in 
which transport investment is described as fundamental to 
maximising investment and attracting business and residents. They 
add the caveat, however, that ‘evaluation is also politically 
connected to the desires of government’ (Blakeley and Evans, 2013, 
p.81), as evaluation potentially becomes a de facto shield of 
accountability. However, ‘It is now generally accepted that many UK 
cities-even those that have done best in recent years-suffer from 
poor, outdated transport infrastructure’ (Docherty, 2009, p.323).  
Docherty is critical of local government planning structures 
comparing UK regional planning to continental Europe and finding a 
‘lack of powerful, strategic and accountable governance (which) 
presents clear difficulty in negotiating, sustaining and implementing 
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a region-wide strategic plan for transport’ (Docherty, 2009. p.325). 
This argument then supports the idea of a strong regional centre to 
drive wider regional policy, arguably a process akin to the City 
Mayor plan. Bolden and Harman (2013), based on Harman (2006), 
identify three areas where High Speed Rail can benefit cities. The 
third element is particularly relevant for this project, discussing how 
high speed hub needs to have good connections to local transport 
systems. To this end Bolden and Harman (2013) advocate a central 
location for stations to take advantage of existing infrastructure, a 
statement with echoes in primary data collected for this project and 
discussed in chapter 3.  
City Mayors: Political change 
The 2010 Coalition Government pushed for directly elected Mayors 
with relatively muted support from the Labour opposition, which had 
previously proposed similar provisions. The first elected mayors had 
been introduced by the Labour Government following the Local 
Government Act of 2000 (Sandford, 2014; Fenwick, Elcock and 
McMillan 2006; Leach and Norris, 2002). This was part of a wider 
swathe of constitutional reform which had begun the Labour 
Governments administration including a directly elected London 
mayor (Loveland, 1999) (Fenwick et al., 2006).  Within a wider 
devolution framework, an elected London Mayoralty was considered 
a potential marker for future devolution of powers to the regions 
(Fenwick, 2006). 
Claims about the efficacy of City Mayors appear to be based more 
on ideology than any specific empirical evidence, (Buckler and 
Dolowitz, 2012). As David Cameron sought to marry traditional 
Thatcherite market-based solutions with a more electorally 
successful centralism the result has been ‘a rolling back of state 
activity in favour of greater localism and voluntary action’ (Buckler 
and Dolowitz, 2012, p.586). Wilby (2012), however, was among 
those sceptical of the power and independence to be afforded these 
positions believing that what David Cameron sought was merely a 
‘credible head of a branch office’ (Wilby, 2012). As John and Cole 
(1999) point out there is a certain inherent contradiction between 
strong leadership and successful liberal democratic government 
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which creates conflict between political and economic power that will 
be examined in later chapters.  
There is however an implicit suggestion within the City Mayor model 
that a strong leader is essential to the success of this system 
(Fenwick and Elcock, 2014). Fenwick and Elcock (2014), building on 
Rhodes (1996) believe that the ‘hollowed out’ state of government 
requires a clearly identified figurehead to engage with the various 
sectors now represented in local governance. Further, Fenwick and 
Elcock (2014) argue that one of the main drivers in introducing 
elected mayors is simply the recognition that local power has been 
diminished and that ‘something should be done about it’. The 
individual leadership provided by City Mayors, as prescribed by 
George Osborne appears pivotal to their evaluation. This concept of 
the ‘big city boss’ has become regarded as alien to UK local 
government though there have been prominent examples in the 
past, Herbert Morrison in London in the 1930s or T. Dan Smith in 
Newcastle in the 1960s for example (John and Cole, 1999). In the 
USA, big name mayors are more commonplace and in parts of 
Europe this is also true (Gerber and Hopkins 2011). There is 
however a contradiction between moves towards a strong executive 
leader and the apparent erosion of power due to the centralising 
tendencies of successive national governments (Fenwick and 
Alcock, 2014). There is also a danger that ‘inspired by society’s call 
for expressive and strong leadership, a leader becomes too 
dominant or authoritarian within the network of involved partners 
and stakeholders’ (Schaap and Verhoel, 2010, p.445).  
Conclusion 
This literature review began by articulating some of the more 
important theories of power, both in general terms and with 
particular relation to civic power structures. Working from Dahl’s The 
Concept of Power through Bachrach and Baratz, and in particular 
Steven Lukes’ Power: a Radical View gives a broad understanding 
of the foundational arguments in this area. The extent to which 
power is held and the nature through which it is acquired is central 
to this project. Stones’ description of a wider range of actors within 
local civic structures, though drawing on 1980s US City politics, still 
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has salience to a study of power distribution today as it described 
the breadth of stakeholders within the public sphere. There are, 
however, gaps in the scholarly knowledge, particularly around UK 
local government, which this project will fill by focusing on Leeds-
which is central to the government’s plans for a Northern 
Powerhouse.  
Academic research around components of devolutionary agendas 
suggests the importance of three different elements to be 
considered i.e. administrative, financial and political, although it 
should be recognised that overlaps exist between the three. 
Administratively, there have been continual changes in structures 
with successive governments initiating new administrative models. 
This indicates that re-organisation of administrative structures is 
driven more by political ideology than notions of competence or 
efficiency as systems are rarely given time to become embedded 
and fruitful. This suggests increasing centralisation of power under 
cover of rhetorical devolution. This paradox will be explored through 
the perceptions of elite interviewees with particular reference to 
administrative structures within the Leeds City Region in the 
following chapters. 
The shift in financial power held by local government is perhaps the 
most notable. Aspects of local life such as housing or public 
transport which City Councils would once have controlled have 
largely been outsourced to private companies (Grimshaw, Vincent 
and Wilmott, 2002). There is a debate around the extent to which 
neo-liberal ideology is responsible for this shift with arguments it is 
fundamental to the change but also a belief it is a consequence of 
shifting funding models driven by efficiency, cost savings and 
improved outcomes. As part of this proposed neo-liberal approach 
to local government finance, there are suggestions of an increase in 
territorial competitiveness being promoted as City Regions are 
encouraged to compete against each other for funding, thus 
arguably reducing collectivist sentiments within local authorities. 
This position will be examined through elite interviews around City 
Deals, austerity policies and the consequences of the 2008 
Financial Crisis.  
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The third element in this devolutionary debate concerns political 
change. The advent of City Mayors has the potential to change the 
political landscape significantly. The amount of power invested in 
these new institutions is contentious with opinions sometimes 
dividing along party political lines. The fact that the directly elected 
mayor system is being imposed without popular support, and 
against the democratic wishes of the people of Leeds, arguably 
undermines its credibility, an issue examined later in chapter five. 
Taken together, the administrative, financial and political aspects of 
power devolution constitute the crux of this debate as it applies to 
the Leeds City Region and data gathered from interviews will be 
informed by and feed into the theoretical work in this literature 
review. 
The regenerative aspect of the project with regard to the city of 
Leeds is covered through an investigation of the proposed transport 
infrastructure investment. With academic research on the wisdom 
and efficacy of such schemes proving unclear, a good comparison is 
provided in the work on Manchester of Blakeley and Evans (2013). 
By conducting interviews from within local elites it will be possible to 
flesh out some of the statistical evidence with particular reference to 
the prospects for the Leeds City Region. By eliciting opinion of local 
elites on their perceptions of infrastructure investment and its effects 
on regeneration and power dynamics it will be possible to fill some 
of the deficiencies in scholarly research in these areas. Utilising 
semi-structured interviews (as outlined in the following 
methodology), will allow participants to express their views fully on 
the range of topics covered in this project helping to fill gaps in the 
academic knowledge in this field. 
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Methodology 
 
Introduction 
The initial impetus for this project came from Steven Burt and Kevin 
Grady of the Leeds Civic Trust, and the brief was very broad with 
plenty of scope to take ownership of the project and adapt it into a 
suitable MSc. by Research project. From initial discussions with 
sponsors and supervisors of the project it became apparent that 
using what Stake (1995) calls a single instrumental case study (with 
Leeds as the city case) would be the most salient choice of 
research. This case study approach aims to broaden the field of 
knowledge, both in respect of the Leeds City Region itself and in the 
wider milieu of local government, whilst remaining cognisant of the 
contextual and subjective element implicit in this typology.  
In gaining qualitative data this research will encompass interviews 
with relevant stakeholders from political and policy elites in Leeds 
and beyond (see index for list). Thus, there will be representatives 
from the three main political parties, Labour, Conservative and 
Liberal Democrats plus the regionalist Yorkshire First Party to obtain 
a broad range of opinions across the political spectrum around 
power dynamics. Interviews with representatives of different 
stakeholder groups will contribute to a more comprehensive 
understanding of the pluralist nature of power structures within the 
Leeds City Region. Representatives from business organisations, 
trade unions and policy groups will therefore be interviewed to allow 
for a broad range of data to be collected. As Stone (1974) originally 
identified, a diverse group of stakeholder representatives now have 
power within local structures and so by widening the representation 
this will improve the relevance of the data collected.  
This breadth of stakeholder inclusion allows the selection to be 
based on purposive sampling, in which those selected for interview 
have the most relevance to the subject and are likely to have wide 
knowledge of areas covered in data collection. This can be aided by 
extensive academic reading around the research area and informed 
  
23 
 
journalistic articles to supplement and inform the data collected from 
these interviews. As there is no identical previous research into the 
areas covered in this research, the design is relatively explorative 
but the use of guidelines created from previous case study 
examples which have proved successful and utilising a proven 
interview methodology renders the research academically sound 
(Gilham, 2001; Yin, 2014).   
Semi-structured interviews have been chosen as the best means of 
gathering primary data as they provide the flexibility not afforded by 
structured interviews whilst largely retaining the consistency 
necessary to provide consistent data. In Charmaz’s work on 
‘grounded theory’ (2006), which takes a constructivist approach, she 
advocates interpretive research, encompassing  ‘flexible guidelines, 
a focus on theory that depends on the researcher’s view; learning 
about the experience within embedded, hidden networks, situations, 
and relationships; and making visible hierarchies of power, 
communication, and opportunity’ (Cresswell, Hanson, Clark, Vicki 
and Morales 2007, p.250). It is also necessary however to bear in 
mind the potential for a ‘shared, implicit knowledge that would affect 
the direction of the interviews’ (Denzen and Lincoln, 2002, p.240). 
The questions then, aimed to be as neutral as possible to avoid any 
researcher bias or leading propositions while still generating 
qualitative data salient to the research criteria and parameters. 
Certain interviewees had poor knowledge of small sections of the 
data collection areas and were given the opportunity to abstain from 
answering these questions as uninformed or coerced answers 
would diminish the quality of data acquired. 
Prior to conducting the interviews extensive theoretical research 
was conducted establishing the most pertinent areas to focus 
research and also to shape the project into a coherent structure. It 
was established primary data collection should begin by examining 
where power is located chiefly utilising Lukes (2005) self-styled 
‘radical’ three dimensional definition of power and Stone’s Urban 
Regime Theory (1989). As has been stated, (Foreman-Peck and 
Lungu, 2009, Rummery and Greener, 2012), any investigation of 
devolution of power must consider the economic, administrative and 
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political aspects of power. This is reflected in the literature review 
and in the structure of the questioning, whereby each of these 
points is explored in separate sections. The chief overarching 
concept amongst these elements is the Northern Powerhouse 
concept, as its introduction impacts on the political, administrative 
and economic structures within the Leeds City Region. The Northern 
Powerhouse appears to be still developing as a concept as 
evidenced by the description of a ‘multilevel, multi-faceted policy 
area that spans a multitude of sectors’ (Nurse, 2015, p.686). 
Epistemology 
The epistemological conflict at the heart of this project is the 
previously noted use of a case study i.e. Leeds, to attempt broader 
conclusions on the efficacy of power distribution without positivist 
research methodology. It appears to fit the mould of a constructivist 
epistemology however by using qualitative data gathering through 
elite interviews to construct viable responses to the questions posed 
within the project and outlined in this methodology. Thus, by eliciting 
views from across the political spectrum about City Mayors and their 
effect on power dynamics, for example, it should be possible to 
construct viable, if potentially subjective, conclusions around this 
development. By contrast, Bryman (2003) argues that ‘because of 
the unstructured nature of most qualitative research with its 
associated lack of specified hypotheses, except in a very loose 
sense, qualitative research is inherently exploratory’ (Bryman, 2003, 
p.84). This suggests it is illusionary to attempt definitive answers to 
questions about Leeds specifically, or broader devolutionary 
typologies from this essentially constructivist study. However the 
project will reach contingent conclusions based on the qualitative 
data collected and supporting scholarly research. 
Analysis 
Although this project uses the conventional analysis process as 
described by Hsieh and Shannon (2005) encompassing data 
collection not based on theoretical perspectives, there will be 
theoretical underpinnings to the analysis. For example, when 
examining the interaction between the different sectors involved in 
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governance cognisance will be taken of all three dimensions 
identified by Lukes (1974; 2005) of power. It is instructive to 
examine how local elites and policy group members view power 
structures and power dynamics from the perspective of the three 
dimensional framework. Theories have been advanced that the 
Northern Powerhouse concept is part of a privatisation of public 
services based on neo-liberal ideology (Boyer, 2000; Lambie, 2009) 
and this is investigated, with particular focus on the Leeds City 
Region. As the concepts included in this study have previously seen 
little academic work with respect to Leeds or most other regional 
English cities this project has few examples to compare with 
theoretically or methodologically. Thus only broader thematic 
studies are employed to anchor the research in current academic 
models. 
Ethics 
Ethical issues have been identified and addressed throughout the 
project. This was achieved initially by submission to the School 
Research and Ethics Panel (SREP) procedure applying to all 
research students at the University of Huddersfield. Throughout the 
project and in particular the interviews, conduct has been clear and 
informative. All participants were given full knowledge of the study 
and their consent was sought at all stages of the process and 
participants were aware that this consent could be withdrawn 
immediately at any stage of the research. Lahman, Geist, 
Rodriguez, Graglia and DeRoche (2010) describe the ideal of 
culturally responsive, relational and reflexive ethics (CRRRE). They 
believe this can improve the ethical stance towards research from 
one that moves ‘above and beyond mere minimalist expectations 
and thus increasing the possibility of ethical research.’ (Lahman et 
al, 2010). This has been a useful system to employ in this research 
as it covers all aspects of ethical concerns that may arise, with 
reflexive ethics having particular salience whilst conducting 
interviews.  
Another ethical issue to arise is the influence of the original sponsor 
of this project. I met with him a few times in the early days of the 
project and he had specific ideas about how the research should be 
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conducted including how the project should be focused, which 
eventually proved too narrow and limiting. He also wanted to employ 
a confrontational style of interview to elicit information whereby 
interviewees would be asked questions to discomfort them. Such an 
approach could not be countenanced within an academic piece of 
work as it would be unethical and betray the trust of participant 
interviewees. Therefore I have had to sacrifice the local knowledge 
and contacts that this sponsor would have brought to the project to 
retain its ethical integrity. This has also made obtaining interviews a 
little more difficult as the sponsor had promised access and 
introductions to his contacts within the Leeds political sphere. 
However using contacts of my own and approaching other potential 
interviewees with my proposed research questions I have been able 
to arrange suitable data collection. Finally, all data protection and 
storage concerns were considered and fulfilled with all data stored in 
secure conditions. Computerised data was stored on pass worded 
computers and all hard copy data held in locked storage.  
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Chapter 1 
The Northern Powerhouse 
 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the perception of political elites and members 
of the policy community to the Northern Powerhouse concept. To 
accomplish this it will primarily employ Lukes’ three dimensional 
view of power and the perception of neo-liberal hegemony within 
government, as outlined by Foreman-Peck and Lungu (2009) and 
Newman (2014). Primary data will be utilised to examine these 
theories in three particular areas. Firstly I will explore perceptions of 
the Northern Powerhouse concept amongst participants concerning 
its conception, implementation and framework. As there appears to 
have been little input from local elites to this process it will be 
instructive to examine their thinking about the process to date and 
how they assess local input to its development. Secondly I will 
examine what opportunities and prospects interviewees see for the 
Northern Powerhouse and explore two main ambitions expressed by 
participants. Firstly, a wish for a genuine decentralising agenda, with 
power devolved across political, administrative and financial arenas, 
which touches on issues of power dynamics. The other issue noted 
is voting reform and a more proportional system to elect a 
scrutinising assembly in alliance with City Mayors suggesting 
misgivings about the role of City Mayors which will be further 
examined in chapter four. 
Finally this chapter will examine perceptions of Leeds as a ‘northern 
powerhouse’ and its position within the Northern Powerhouse. A 
comparison (as mentioned by interviewees) will be drawn with 
Manchester, particularly using Blakeley and Evans (2013) work on 
the regeneration of East Manchester. This comparison between 
Northern Powerhouse Cities has echoes of the competitive nature of 
City Deals and a consequent shift from perceived collectivist 
attitudes among left - led local councils and this will be investigated 
within this chapter. As this imposed competitive paradigm has 
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intimations of neo-liberal market creation within it, this links to the 
debate about the neo-liberal economic hegemony increasingly 
imposed on local government by the centre.  
Defining the Northern Powerhouse 
The Northern Powerhouse concept appears to be relatively poorly 
defined to date, with little academic literature published, and this 
lack of clarity is reflected within the perceptions of interviewees. The 
idea it is essentially a creation of the current Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, George Osborne, comes through strongly in the primary 
data, creating a negative impression among participants as it 
suggests a top-down, imposed model. Vicky Seddon (Chair of 
Unlock Democracy) describes how ‘George Osborne has been very 
clever in using to his own advantage (the idea that) too much power 
has been based in Westminster’ 1 Paul Salveson (Chair of the 
Hannah Mitchell Foundation) describes it as ‘an extremely clever 
piece of branding again by Osborne’ 2 and Peter Box (Chairman of 
West Yorkshire Combined Authority) states: 
If George Osborne doesn’t get to take over as 
Conservative Leader he should get a job in 
marketing because he’s created a phrase called the 
Northern Powerhouse which most people can’t 
explain and in fact the recent survey shows that 
most people don’t understand it full stop. 
(Box, 2015) 
This feeling on the left of the Northern Powerhouse as essentially a 
marketing project created by George Osborne is further echoed by 
Stewart Golton (Leader of the Liberal Democrat group in Leeds) who 
states that the term is ‘something that the Chancellor has chosen 
and it doesn’t actually talk about anything which is physically 
happening’ 3 
1. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2105 
2. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
3. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
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Antipathy on the left appears to suggest elements of party political 
preconception in addition to ideological opposition to the 
Conservative Governments Northern Powerhouse agenda. Although 
participants express criticism of the creation and conceptualisation 
of the Northern Powerhouse framework, all are supportive of a 
devolutionary agenda, but little consensus about how this should be 
approached exists. The Northern Powerhouse is currently perceived 
by elements within local elites as largely conceptual with Golton, for 
example, stating ‘It’s a concept for the Conservative Party to appear 
relevant to communities in the North’ 4. Seddon 5 also represents it 
as a ‘concept’ and Salveson describes it as ‘intangible’ 6, suggesting 
a lack of clarity around the project. Ed Cox of the Institute for Public 
Policy Research (IPPR) also described it as ‘a concept, rather than 
any actual, physical thing at the moment’ (Cox, 2015) and Labour 
MP Dan Jarvis, in a speech to the IPPR, further talked of how ‘there 
is no clear strategy, still no definable boundaries for how far the 
powerhouse might extend, or how the pieces will fit together’ (Jarvis, 
2015).   
Thus, suggestions of an imposed agenda dominated by central 
government, in which local politicians are given little information 
about, or input to the concept, appear salient. There is an implied 
perception of central government believing that local government will 
provide no resistance to its devolutionary agenda and will subsume 
any reservations they may have. This is indicative of the third face of 
power Lukes proposes, as central government assumes its agenda 
will be reluctantly accepted owing to a lack of ideological 
alternatives.  
Leigh, however, believes that ‘the model is very much decided’ 7 
suggesting a clarity in the scheme which isn’t indicated in other 
interview data.  
4. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
5. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2105 
6.  Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
7. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
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As Leigh represents the business community his concerns are 
essentially economic and economic elements do appear strongest 
within the perceptions of the Northern Powerhouse model. This 
perceived economic primacy within an underpinning neo-liberal 
agenda suggests an attempt by central governments to further the 
pro-market agenda. This finds support from a leftist interpretation of 
the Northern Powerhouse concept. 
Bill Adams (TUC Regional Secretary for Yorkshire & the Humber) 
believes that the main goal of the model is ‘rebalancing the economy 
away from the reliance on the finance sector in London’ 8 and this is 
a common theme. Leigh also references London and its financial 
sector and argues that the Northern Powerhouse is constructed to 
‘see businesses come to the North’ 9. Interestingly, Golton argues 
that the economic success of London had financed the rest of the 
UK economy throughout the New Labour period allowing it to invest 
significantly in public services through taxation levied on the finance 
sector: 
The level of its economic activity was such that the 
central government could take in high-tax revenues 
which allowed them to depend less on the citizen-
based taxes and therefore continue a public-sector 
delivering economy but not at the levels of 
expectation on personal income that you might find 
in places like Scandinavia or the continent     
(Golton, 2015) 
 
8. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015  
9. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
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This analysis suggests a move away from the redistributive model 
that Golton 10 ascribes to the New Labour Government. It is argued 
(Hall, 2011), however, that the Blair and Brown Governments also 
employed a neo-liberal model during the UK economic boom prior to 
the financial crash in 2008, creating market mechanisms within local 
authority structures. By allowing City Regions to retain more of the 
business rates they collect, it is argued 11, that central government is 
ceding more economic power to the regions through greater 
financial control of taxation revenues. This, however, is contested by 
participants on the left interviewed for this project (Box; Adams; 
Seddon; Salveson), who view it as a furthering of neo-liberal models 
to enhance market competition between Northern Powerhouse 
cities. 
In political terms the Northern Powerhouse concept appears a little 
clearer in its current aims. There is some support for the City Mayor 
structure within the proposals, from Andrew Carter (Leader of the 
Conservative Group in Leeds) and Leigh for example. However 
there are worries about the accountability of this structure. Seddon 
believes that there is ‘an imposition of a form of governance without 
consent’ 12 and there is a further worry that the process is about 
‘deals being done behind closed doors with a handful of politicians 
and senior civil servants and local government officers with the 
general public being passive by-standers’ 13. This characterisation 
suggests an ideological imposition of the concept contrary to broad 
public opinion, providing echoes of Lukes’ (1974; 2005) theory of 
pragmatic public consensus towards possession of power, despite 
resentment of its imposition. Only Carter 14 expresses genuine 
support for the City Mayor concept, perhaps reflecting his 
Conservative Party allegiance.  
10. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
11. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
12. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2105 
13. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
14. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
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There is some support for the suggestion (Adams; Box) that the 
political aspect of the Northern Powerhouse is concerned with 
removing Labour strongholds in some Northern Cities and 
potentially furthering central government control through pliant and 
ideologically compatible civic leaders. It is further suggested 
(Adams; Box) that City Mayors are potentially a ‘Trojan horse’ to 
extend national control through more compliant civic leaders. There 
are, however, intimations that City Mayors may allow for local 
resistance to national agendas which is discussed further in chapter 
four.  
Northern Powerhouse – Possibilities 
Consistent themes do emerge from interview data about the 
elements a successful Northern Powerhouse model should contain. 
Perhaps the predominant of these criteria is a rebalancing of the 
economy away from London and the South East to the North of 
England. The Department of Transport’s strategy report states that 
‘Our aim is for economic growth in the North to be at least as high as 
the rest of the country, to complement and act as a balance to the 
economic weight of London (Department of Transport, 2015). 
Adams echoes this, stating ‘there’s more potential and opportunity 
for us (the North of England) to contribute to the national economy 
more than we do now’ 15. Equally there is a belief that significant 
investment is needed in the project for it to be meaningful (Seddon; 
Adams; Box; Salveson). There is however a worry that the aim of 
the project is to disguise national government spending cuts, under 
austerity policies, to the regions 16. Golton argues that by 
implementing financial cuts to local authorities but devolving power 
‘it’s very hard to actually make yourselves relevant at all if all you are 
ever able to do to people is say oh it’s not our fault, it’s not our cut, 
it’s a decision taken somewhere else’ 17.  
15. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015  
16. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015  
17. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
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As austerity measures and statutory contracting out of public 
services are extended, worries are expressed that local politicians 
will be blamed for implementing cuts, undermining their power 
through public disapproval. Leigh 18  believes that local authorities do 
want more spending powers and that the Northern Powerhouse 
concept is a genuine attempt to provide this.  
This contradiction is perhaps indicative of the conflicting interests 
represented by the interviewees. Leigh, as a representative of 
business, would arguably be more supportive of promised funding 
increases and potential loosening of local political control. Golton, as 
a local politician, appears more likely to recognise a prospective loss 
of power for elected representatives and an attempt to devolve 
blame for austerity measures instigated by national government. 
Additionally there is cynicism on the left about the dismantling of 
collectivist structures perceived to be inherent in the Northern 
Powerhouse framework, viewing City Deals as indicative of neo-
liberal market competition between cities, imposed by central 
government. Their potential to cause overt conflict between cities is 
arguably redolent of the power dynamics noted by Stone (1974), as 
competing elements vie to attract power through the devolutionary 
agenda.  
Participants are broadly in favour of devolution of political power 
although the City Region model finds little support. Some (Salveson; 
Adams) believe that a wider Yorkshire Assembly would be a better 
solution, while others (Seddon; Golton) argue for a smaller 
administrative footprint such as the current local authorities. Box 
argues for a ‘Council of the North’ 19 where local authority leaders 
can meet on a regular basis to ensure a closer working relationship.  
As an opponent of the competitive element of City Deals he argues 
such a construct should enable local authorities ‘to work together 
across the North and not compete with each other, it’s not a  
18. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
19. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
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competition with Manchester or a competition with Liverpool or the 
North-East’ 20. Seddon 21 also calls for co-operation between local 
authorities across the Northern Powerhouse believing they need to 
create new structures amongst themselves to work together. This 
collectivist approach appears contrary to general impressions of the 
direction the Northern Powerhouse is moving on collectivist activity 
among its cities, including Leeds. 
When asked what one thing would help to re-invigorate local 
democracy and encourage people to engage with the democratic 
process, two dominant themes emerged. Firstly there was a desire 
for more power to be held locally based on an agreement that power 
had become increasingly centralised. Adams, echoing Burt and 
Grady (1994) mentions the situation in Victorian Cities in the North 
of England, ‘Leeds in particular - the fabric of the cities at that time, 
they were marvellous places. They were great centres of power’ 22. 
In contrast he describes how currently ‘most Councillors say to me 
all I deal with is bins and dog-shit’ 23. 
Salveson concurs, arguing that power should be devolved to the 
lowest level possible. He particularly praises parish councils and 
states that Leeds has some excellent examples of this but that 
further powers are needed to promote ‘the institutions that people 
feel belong to them and that they can make a difference by having a 
voice’ 24. Box 25 believes the main problem is a lack of fiscal control 
leading to a loss of relevance and status for local government and 
consequent public apathy. This argument of a loss of power is 
countered by Carter, 26  who believes that greater co-operation  
20. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
21. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2105 
22. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
23. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
24. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
25. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
26. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
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between elites across the spectrum would have positive 
consequences. He states that ‘instead of arguing with each other 
we’ve got to start talking to the people who make the economy work’ 
27
. Thus, power held by local elites could increase as a lack of overt 
conflict would improve the public perception of local politicians 
encouraging greater devolution of economic and political power by 
central government.  
The second issue raised in the primary data, which links in to 
Carter’s ideas around co-operation between politicians, is voting 
reform, and specifically Proportional Representation (P.R.). 
Salveson argues:  
 
I think if you had a fairer voting system that 
would get more people involved and engaged, 
people would feel their vote was actually worth 
something and it would actually create a much 
more inclusive sort of politics where politicians 
were forced to actually work together rather 
than the sort of traditional British model of a sort 
of quite a confrontational form of politics, which 
again is a big turn-off for people.  
(Salveson, 2015) 
There is support for this argument, to varying degrees, from Seddon, 
Carter, Box, Adams and Golton who believes that although P.R. 
may not be a long term solution to disengagement it could be useful 
in the short term. Salveson further argues that the UK is ‘one of the 
most disengaged societies in Europe…particularly young people’ 28. 
As Mycock and Tonge point out, however, ‘it is important to 
disaggregate the more evident decline of loyalty to particular political 
parties or institutions from wider civic disengagement’ (Mycock and 
Tonge, 2012, p.155).  
27. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
28. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
  
36 
 
Worries are expressed about scrutiny of proposed City Mayors and 
an Assembly elected by PR, as in London, is regarded (Seddon; 
Salveson; Carter) as an accountable, democratic solution to this 
problem. As this option is not part of the Northern Powerhouse 
concept it does suggest that rather than devolving power to a wider 
range of actors, current devolutionary plans will concentrate power 
in the hands of a City Mayor, broadly perceived to be 
unaccountable. This provides further indications of Wilby’s (2015) 
idea of City Mayors as ‘head of a branch office’ of central 
government. However, as many of these City Mayors appear likely 
to be from a different political party to that of central government 
there is potential for resistance to the centralising tendency evident 
for decades.  
There is also gathering support within local elites for locally 
designed solutions to perceived local government problems. Adams 
argues ‘it’s up to us rather than relying on political opportunists in 
London 29 and Box argues against ‘centrally imposed ideas’ 30. 
Seddon and her organisation Unlock Democracy believe in a locally 
drafted, written, Constitution for Local Authorities which they believe 
would provide greater stability to enable long-term planning. This 
strong feeling against imposed models of devolution among elites 
suggests a challenge to the second dimension of power (Lukes, 
2005) exhibited within current public discourse. Ideas which had 
appeared off the agenda in the public realm for some time are 
demonstrated within interview data. In place of an acceptance of the 
neo-liberal hegemony that appeared to exist within local 
government, there is evidence of a desire for a return to collectivist 
policies from within local elites and resistance to top-down 
devolutionary paradigms and neo-liberal funding models and market 
orientated structures. 
29. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
30. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
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Leeds- A Northern Powerhouse? 
Interviewees were asked their opinion on Leeds’ standing within a 
national, European and World context to gauge elite opinion about 
the power the City is perceived as projecting. In 2006 Local 
government Secretary Ruth Kelly was quoted as saying that ‘Leeds 
is ready to become a leading European city rivalling Barcelona, 
Frankfurt and Amsterdam’ (Green, 2006, p.1). All participants 
expressed broadly positive opinions of Leeds, although there were 
frequent caveats to this positivity. At the lower end of expectations 
Carter describes Leeds as the major City in the North East of 
England and ‘that’s the role we should be establishing for ourselves 
31
. Salveson also finds problems with Leeds potential status as a 
European City stating that it ‘Would like to believe itself as a 
European City but overall I think it’s quite parochial’ 32. Leigh echoes 
this and believes there is more value in the Yorkshire brand than 
that for Leeds perhaps indicative of a problem with identity for 
people in Leeds leading to the parochialism Salveson mentions.  
A comparison with Manchester was drawn by several of the 
participants. Salveson describes Manchester as ‘unequivocally a 
European City’ 33, partly through what he considers better political 
leadership but also artistically and culturally too. This idea that the 
political leadership in Manchester has proved more effective ties in 
with perceptions of Richard Leese, leader of Manchester City 
Council, being part of the Northern Powerhouse agenda in a way 
that the political leadership in Leeds is not (Ashton, 2014). This then 
suggests that levels of engagement local politicians have in the 
process has significant influence on outcomes in terms of power 
they may acquire.  
31. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
32. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
33. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
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Adams 34 disagrees about cultural capital in the City evidencing the 
new arena. He does point, however, to the lack of a high profile 
football team as an impediment to global recognition, with the 
obvious comparison being Manchester. There, the role of 
Manchester City FC in helping to regenerate the East Manchester 
area is noted by Blakeley & Evans who speak of how ‘the club is 
undertaking a major investment programme in the area surrounding 
the (former Commonwealth Games) stadium’ (Blakeley & Evans, 
2013, p.33). The city’s other club, Manchester United, are 
additionally described by Bose (2000) as the worlds’ premier football 
club bringing awareness of Manchester to a European and global 
audience. Leigh additionally describes an East/West divide in 
Northern England in which Manchester is seen to have had better 
funding and moved ahead of Leeds, thus helping to improve 
prospects for its City Region. This is also indicative of the market 
created between cities by the City Deals agenda. 
This has potentially been highlighted by Manchester becoming one 
of the first City Regions to reach a City Deal while Leeds still has not 
done so. Carter also describes how ‘the Manchester authority, 
despite its disagreements with a government of another persuasion, 
has worked very closely with it’ 35, which supports his belief in cross-
party co-operation producing positive outcomes. It further suggests 
that local authorities co-operating with central governments 
devolutionary agenda receive greater power, indicative of national 
governments control of the agenda and potential attempts at 
supressing conflicting opinions. 
There is, however, data produced that shows more ambitious views 
on Leeds’ status. Seddon describes Leeds as a ‘cosmopolitan city’ 
36 which views itself as a European City rather than a national city 
and it’s additionally described as ‘Definitely on a wider  
34. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
35. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
36. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2105 
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European level’ 37. Adams 38 feels Leeds is certainly a European 
city, and potentially a global city too, with an outward facing profile. 
The City appears pre-eminent in Yorkshire both in size and prestige 
and is regarded as prominent on the national stage. Its status as a 
European city appears less certain and there is a widespread 
perception that Manchester is ahead of Leeds in economic, cultural, 
political and indeed devolutionary considerations. Leigh however 
takes a more optimistic view, stating: 
We want the Northern Powerhouse of England to be 
regarded as a place where it’s highly-regarded for 
doing business and so in that sense, will Leeds ever 
become World Class? Who knows ?. But should we 
set our ambitions any lower than that? No. Of 
course we wanna [sic] try and get that.  
(Leigh, 2015)  
Conclusion 
This chapter examined the perceptions of local elites to the 
Northern Powerhouse framework. The principal idea emerging 
around the concept is that it is essentially a creation of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne. This idea is 
viewed negatively by most interviewees as it is considered to be 
essentially a concept rather than a properly fleshed-out 
programme. There are concerns, particularly on the left (Box; 
Adams; Seddon; Salveson), that a Conservative Government is 
controlling this devolutionary agenda and imposing it on local 
authorities which are largely Labour controlled, a theory 
redolent of third dimensional ideological imposition of power. 
Thus, local government elites while consenting to the Northern 
Powerhouse concept of devolution, resent its’ overt imposition 
by central government.  
37.  Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
38. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
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Further, with strong support being provided by business 
representatives there are indications that financial outcomes 
and the promotion of a pro-business agenda are significant 
drivers of the reforms. 
In political terms, there is some support for the City Mayor 
model but general concern about the lack of democratic 
accountability such a potentially powerful figure may possess. 
Additionally there is a feeling of City Mayors being imposed by 
central government despite a failed referendum in 2012 which is 
further indication of the concept of resigned acceptance (Lukes, 
1974; 2005), whereby, despite expressing democratic 
opposition to the City Mayor model there is little overt public 
objection to its subsequent implementation. 
Unsurprisingly participants expressed different ambitions for the 
Northern Powerhouse, with two issues being identified as 
potentially important. Firstly, there is a desire for genuine de-
centralisation of power, apparent from all participants, but 
considered unlikely as central government was viewed as 
controlling the devolutionary agenda, This agenda setting is 
indicative of Lukes’ (1974; 2005) second face of power where 
covert conflict is evident and local solutions are excluded. The 
other issue raised is voting reform, with substantial support 
showing in primary data for a more proportional system of 
electing a scrutinising Assembly to accompany the City Mayor 
model. As, neither electoral process changes nor an elected 
assembly are currently planned, this suggests that local elite 
opinion is out of step with the Northern Powerhouse agenda. 
This further implies an imposed democratic model that is 
unwelcome locally but has met little organised opposition, a 
paradox predicted by Lukes’ (1974; 2005) third dimension of 
power. 
When asked to assess Leeds’ standing within wider contexts 
there was some consensus among interviewees. Leeds was 
broadly viewed as big enough to be regarded as a European 
City, similar in that respect to Manchester, but perhaps lacking 
that cities brand recognition. There was additionally an identity 
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problem between the Leeds publics’ perceptions of themselves 
as being Leodensians or Yorkshiremen/women. The 
comparison with Manchester was drawn quite widely with a 
belief that Leeds was behind in several areas. Perhaps as 
Manchester was one of the first cities to reach a City Deal and 
Sir Richard Leese is an integral part of the development and 
implementation of the Northern Powerhouse this indicates a 
sense that Leeds has become alienated from the process and 
has consequently seen its’ power reduced. There is an 
additional belief that the projected status of the city is then 
potentially indicative of the perceived power that Leeds holds 
within the Northern Powerhouse and beyond. As local elites are 
critical of this perceived status it may represent a critique of a 
loss of power both for the city and for its politicians.  
Further, the break with collectivism indicated by individual City 
Deals appears to demonstrate increased competiveness among 
local authorities, representative of increasing neo-liberal, market 
ideology across the Northern Powerhouse, imposed against the 
wishes of most local authorities. This paradox demonstrates 
Lukes (2005, p.109) idea of elites consenting to power whilst 
still resenting its implementation mode. This idea of unwilling 
consent will be further explored in the following chapter on 
administrative devolution and subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 2 
Administrative Devolution Analysis 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the two chief elements of administrative 
reform within the devolution agenda in Leeds with primary data used 
to examine the paramount theories discussed within the literature 
review i.e. Stones’ Urban Regime Theory and, particularly, Lukes’ 
theory of three dimensional power. Firstly, I will analyse the City 
Region model and how local elites view the validity of this concept 
and consider whether this is a wholly administrative reform. This will 
be measured against theories that indicate economic or ideological 
motives underpinning these structural changes. By replacing the 
largely left- led local authorities the impression is created that 
central government is attempting to further its’ political and 
economic agenda and undermining the power of local government. 
There is a further belief that increased neo-liberal structures are 
intended by the competitive nature of City Deals within the City 
Region model 
The second element of this chapter will be an examination of the 
other main administrative reform under the Coalition and 
subsequent Conservative Government. The replacement of 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) by Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs) is one of the most discussed areas of change 
within interview. Whilst once again utilising the theories of Lukes’ 
and Stones, further analysis will be employed using the wider 
theoretical literature discussed previously including an examination 
of the democratic legitimacy and economic competence of the 
reforms as perceived by the interviewees. As LEPs are broadly 
viewed as an attempt to weaken the powers of local authorities, 
individually and collectively, this further suggests diminution of 
power of local politicians is at the heart of the localism agenda. The 
previous RDAs were perceived as more collectivist, as they included 
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more third sector actors such as trade unions, suggesting that LEPs 
are part of a market orientated devolutionary process. 
City Regions 
A reading of Lukes’ Power: a Radical View (1974) suggests that the 
imposition of City Regions deals is indicative of an attempt to 
implant hegemonic neo-liberal values into local government. As City 
Regions have to compete for economic resources by satisfying 
demands from the centre, this idea has traction. However, from 
primary data collected for this project City Regions are broadly, but 
with qualifications, accepted by local elites as valid administrative 
constructs, although their approval derives from different 
justifications. Leigh states his support, as the model brings ‘real 
wealth creation and new businesses within the region, overcoming a 
lack of political neutrality or pro-business leadership’ 39. This 
ostensibly economic reasoning is supported by Andrew Carter as 
the City Region model ‘recognises the way local economies work 
rather than political boundaries’ 40. Box also advocated City Regions 
for their economic benefits as they are the ‘best model of creating 
the most growth, most quickly’ 41.  
One dissenting voice is Paul Salveson of Yorkshire First who 
favours a sub-regional level of government, and is a particular 
admirer of the German system, whereby Kreise provide district level 
governance between the City and State. Salveson 42 however, 
believes that culturally and politically a Yorkshire Parliament would 
have more popular/populist appeal and that this cultural and political 
validity trumps economic considerations outlined by others, which 
he also questions. The economic justification proposed implies that 
City regions are essentially an economic construct of central 
government with the potential to be manipulated by central 
government. 
39. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
40. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
41. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
42. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
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This apparent imposition of the hegemonic economic neo-liberal 
ideology and statutory promotion of business interests within, and 
among local authorities certainly resonates with the concept of 
Lukes’ third dimensional power. The competitive element implicit in 
the City Deals is further evidence of this ideological face of power 
but does find some incipient opposition from within interview data. 
There is evident overt and latent conflict between central 
government proposals which contain ideological elements and 
undertake to implant greater neo-liberal economic and the 
collectivist principles within local government and the largely Labour 
controlled City Regions that constitute the Northern Powerhouse, 
such as Leeds. Leigh, for example, describes how ‘You’ve got a 
Conservative Government with this model for devolution giving it to 
the combined authority which is all solidly Labour controlled’ 43. As 
this perceived attempt to further embed neo-liberalism into City 
Regions advances it does provide echoes of O’Leary’s (1987) 
argument that ‘ideology legitimates decisions taken for other 
reasons’. 
Box agrees, and believes that Conservative MPs locally are 
attempting to ‘stop a Leeds City Region model based on partisan 
political reasons’ 44. From a centrist position, Golton also believes 
that central government is imposing a deal in which increased 
decision making is exchanged for accepting ‘the model the 
government is interested in’ 45. This creates a paradox, redolent of 
Lukes’ third face of power, whereby City Regions, through the City 
Deal process, are given notionally greater spending potential but at 
the expense of accepting increased restrictions on spending options 
through statuary limitations from central government. This idea is 
further supported by MacLennan and O’Sullivan (2013). 
43. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
44. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
45. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
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The majority of data gathered for this research suggests that left- 
leaning elites tend to support City Regions as a potential bulwark 
against further neo-liberal policies being introduced within local 
government despite interview data indicating the contrary. Adams 46 
sees City Regions potentially combining to help maintain collectivist 
policies and actions in local government. He also argues that a 
wider co-operative mechanism would allow for greater regional 
diversity in industrial growth accompanied by a more integrated 
transport system. This appears to be at most an unintended meso- 
consequence of the macro-governmental intention of creating 
economically competitive City Regions.  
All primary interview data suggests administrative change instituted 
through the City Region model are taken for political, economic or 
ideological reasons rather than to promote positive administrative 
outcomes aligned to public demands. This then indicates evidence 
of third dimensional power as the public within City Regions are 
offered a vote in a model they have not endorsed or requested, but 
which Central Government claims to be in their interest. The 
perceived lack of interest in, or dissatisfaction with administrative 
reforms is perhaps best demonstrated by Police and Crime 
Commissioners (PCCs) introduced by the last coalition government 
despite apparent apathy from the general public. As Golton points 
out they are considered ‘irrelevant. But if that’s all that’s on offer 
then you’ve got to run with it’ 47. This is supported by Adams who 
talks of the ‘lack of credibility and lack of democratic accountability’ 
48
 of the PCCs. Box is even more scathing of structural changes, 
pointing out that the large majorities against elected mayors in 
recent local referenda within the Leeds City Region undermine the 
legitimacy of their imposition and describing this imposition as ‘a 
load of bollocks’ 49.  
46. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
47. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
48. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
49. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
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The consensus, particularly on the left, is that, despite some 
economic justification, City Regions have been introduced as part of 
an ideological dismantling of previous local government structures 
suggesting an attempt to further neo-liberalism within local 
government and reducing local politicians’ power to resist this 
economic and political agenda.  
Several of the interviewees (Salveson, Leigh, Carter, Golton and 
Seddon) discuss the competition between City Regions inherent in 
the devolutionary process and further mention the disadvantage that 
the Leeds City Region is suffering by stalling on a deal. Many also 
draw unfavourable comparisons with the Manchester City Region 
which is seen as leading the competitive process of City Deals thus 
enhancing the regenerative efforts of the New East Manchester 
(NEM) urban regeneration project, detailed by Blakeley and Evans 
(2013). Respondents, on the left in particular, are critical of the lack 
of a redistributive process within local administrative reforms. 
Andrew Carter however disagrees, describing the previous 
redistributive element of the RDA model as ‘a South Yorkshire slush 
fund’ 50.The competitive element to the City Region model inherent 
within the administrative devolution process appears redolent of an 
attempt to extend an economic and structural neo-liberal hegemony 
to local government, particularly in Labour strongholds such as the 
Leeds City Region containing the five West Yorkshire Metropolitan 
Councils of Leeds, Bradford, Wakefield, Kirklees and Calderdale.   
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) 
The general consensus around LEPs, from primary data gathered 
through interviews could broadly be described as negative but 
improving. All the respondents with the exception of Box, who is a 
board member on Leeds City Region LEP, are critical, particularly of 
the creation and early stages of Local Enterprise Partnerships. 
Leigh, Seddon, Adams and Salveson express a preference for the 
previous Regional Development Agency (RDA) model.  
50. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
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They argue that RDAs were abolished largely as a political move to 
reduce the influence of what Adams describes as ‘third sector and 
trade union’ 51 actors. Additionally there is a belief that RDAs were 
abolished with little or no thought to what a successor agency might 
be and that LEPs were largely an ‘afterthought’ 52. 
Significant support for the view of Phillips (2010) and Johnston 
(2014) that the biggest problem for LEPs, initially at least, was an 
inadequate funding level also emerges from primary data. Carter, 
who is broadly supportive of LEPs, describes how they got off to a 
slow start ‘partly because sufficient funding wasn’t available’ 53. He 
does however believe this problem has now been rectified and that 
increased funding has seen LEPs improve on the previous RDAs. 
The concern around funding levels is shared by business 
representatives such as Leigh who argues that ‘they’ve never had 
any funding with which to operate’ 54. Therefore the two interviewees 
who might be expected to be most positive about the potential for 
greater business involvement in local development agencies 
because of their respective constituencies are actually relatively 
critical. Salveson further critiques LEPs as under-resourced and 
compares the model unfavourably with European systems, which he 
argues, receive better funding and are additionally more 
representative of the different sectors within local power structures.  
Primary data then supports the view of Doyle (2013) who argued 
that economic centralism was at the heart of the introduction of 
LEPs as the lack of central government funding and the controls on 
its spending are indicative of further consolidation of economic 
power over local administrative agencies.  
51. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
52. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2105 
53. I Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
54. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
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As business participation has also increased, at the expense of third 
sector actors, this implies an attempt to further the dominant 
economic ideology through administrative restructuring under the 
guise of devolving elements of spending power to local agencies. 
Private finance has been introduced into public sector schemes at a 
regional level without any serious debate (Ruane, 2010) indicative of 
a covert, non-decision making face of power, Lukes’ (1974; 2005) 
second face of power, in which increased public expenditure and 
control of expenditure, has become a non-option. 
This suggests a deepening of the inherent contradiction, as 
highlighted by Davies (2004), between business interests and 
democratic requirements and the deficiency with regards to 
representation of either constituency. This representative deficit was 
mentioned by Adams, who argues that the reason given for the 
replacement of the Yorkshire Forward RDA is that it ‘was abolished 
because it was undemocratic. Unfortunately so is the LEP’ 55. This 
lack of representative legitimacy is also noted by Golton with 
regards to the business sector, ‘Just because you’re talking to some 
business people doesn’t mean that you’re talking to business as a 
whole’ 56. He also argues that although LEPs were intended to be 
more relevant to the economic needs of business and politicians the 
overall perception of those outside the partnerships does not 
support this argument. The notion of a less representative agency is 
mentioned by all interviewees, although they emphasise different 
aspects of this deficiency partially predicated on their own 
constituency.  
Interviewees with a pro-business agenda such as Leigh or Carter 
express concerns about the lack of business representatives on 
LEP committees whilst interviewees such as Adams or Seddon from 
a leftist position are worried by excessive business control over 
LEPs agendas and composition.  
55. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
56. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
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This leftist position is indicative of a fear of a Conservative 
Government’s attempts to further its economic and political ideology 
into local government against the wishes of elected local councillors 
and arguably thereby the local electorate. This supports a reading of 
the Northern Powerhouse concepts’ administrative devolution as 
indicative of Lukes’ third face of power in which an attempt is made 
to influence peoples’ opinions through ideological reshaping of local 
power structures. It further demonstrates characteristics of the path 
dependency seen within the historical institutionalism of Skocpol 
(1979) or Pierson (2000) in which decisions taken at each critical 
juncture are more likely to affect (or limit) downstream policy choices 
which makes continuing on the path set at the outset more likely. 
The exception to this view of increasing central government control 
of local institutions, however, is Peter Box who as Labour leader of 
Wakefield Council and the West Yorkshire Combined Authority 
might have been expected to be as critical as others on the left 
within elite power structures. He is however a strong supporter of 
the work of the LEPs, if not perhaps their inception, and was keen to 
point out the documented successes of the Leeds LEP and their 
support from the Prime Minister 57.  
This indicates the extent to which development agencies had 
progressed through recent government reforms from the findings of 
John and Cole (2000) who believed that a small number of local 
politicians controlled the RDAs. Salveson disagrees, however, 
stating that power still ‘lies with a very small group of politicians in 
the centre of Leeds’ 58. Further, he argues that there has been ‘a 
gradual shift away from local authorities and local democracy 
towards the centre, although there’s been a lot of rhetoric about 
localism from both this government and the previous Labour 
government’ 59.  
57. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
58. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
59. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
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Vicky Seddon 60 further points to the statutory instruments that had 
been imposed on local government thereby reducing local 
government’s scope for spending decisions and priorities. All 
interviewees believed that power had moved away from City 
Regions, like Leeds, towards central government as a consequence 
of the actions of successive governments of different political hues. 
Box describes the UK, contentiously, as ‘the most centralised state 
in Europe’ 61, a statement echoed on the opposite side of the 
political spectrum, as ‘The UK’s one of the most centralised 
democracies in Western Europe’ 62. Interestingly when asked where 
power lies within City Regions i.e. whether with local politicians or 
more centrally both Leigh and Adams talked about power as 
exercised by regional enterprise agencies.  
This appears redolent of an economic view of power consistent with 
a growing neo-liberalism within real structures of local governance. 
However, Stones’ Urban Regime Theory (1974) suggests the 
amount of central government funding of local government should 
insulate them from business domination but this is counteracted by 
statutory financial considerations, which favour business interests 
over local governance particularly within the procurement process. 
This is further highlighted by the reduction of government financing 
and the increased hypothecation of that funding into specific areas 
as alluded to by Seddon 63. As Waite et al. (2013) point out a 
reduction in funding with greater strictures on spending restrictions 
is counter-intuitive with devolution of administrative power. The 
issue of financial devolution appears implicit within administrative 
devolution and this link will be further explored within the following 
chapter. 
60. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
61. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
62. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
63. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
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Conclusion 
Lukes’ paradigmatic work about power structures and the different 
faces of power have been explored in this chapter. Initial 
investigations through secondary research provided evidence of 
both covert and ideological power, (Lukes’ second and third faces of 
power), implicit within the Northern Powerhouse concept of 
devolution. Primary data however suggests greater endorsement of 
City Regions and Local Enterprise Partnerships with both finding 
some support within local elite opinion. City Regions, although 
ostensibly administrative constructs are considered by all 
respondents as justified by economic criteria.  All interviewees 
agree, an economic construct, with neo-liberal ideological 
underpinning, has been imposed by central government rather than 
decided at a local/regional/city level.  
This ideological imposition is indicative of Lukes’ third dimensional 
power being implicit within the City Region model. However, 
interviewees on the left stated their belief in City Regions as a 
potential bulwark against this further institutionalisation of 
hegemonic economic principles suggesting resistance to this 
domination of power by central government. Those on the political 
right, conversely, view City Regions as advancing business interests 
within local governance, indicative of the market orientated 
approach of neo-liberalism. Both perspectives are paradoxically 
salient considering the ongoing potential to shape and inform the 
direction of City Regions within deals offered through the Northern 
Powerhouse agenda. 
There are additionally elements within City Region deals indicative 
of the structuralist work of Stone. Through ideological influence on 
structural reforms, potentially destructive tension (Davies, 2002) is 
created between liberalism and democracy. Consequently 
democratic outcomes are subservient to neo-liberal ideology, 
particularly in regard to directly elected City Regions and their 
competitive City Deal agenda. Further to this, covert conflict is 
apparent through central governments apparently paradoxical model 
  
52 
 
in which increased central control of devolved power is inherent to 
the Northern Powerhouse concept. Leeds City Region is generally 
considered among interviewees to have fared poorly through the 
Northern Powerhouse City Deal agenda but blame for this is largely 
laid on local politicians rather than the scheme itself and critical 
comparisons are made with other City Regions, particularly 
Manchester which is widely considered as the leading example of a 
regenerative paradigm (Blakeley & Evans, 2013).  
The replacement of RDAs with LEPs is however classed by 
interviewees as a political rather than an administrative decision with 
divisions along political lines in support for this restructuring model. 
Those on the right and pro-business side (Carter; Leigh) believe 
LEPs allow for greater business participation in local government 
which, while potentially diluting political power, improves 
effectiveness. Most on the left and centre (Adams; Golton; Salveson 
& Seddon, but not Box) believe LEPS were introduced as a way of 
increasing private business influence within local government and 
institutionalising competition among City Regions at the expense of 
the previously more collectivist ethos among Labour dominated 
Councils. This line of thinking evidences an extension of the 
hegemonic political and economic ideology, achieved through a 
practically uncontested model, emblematic of Lukes’ thinking on 
non-decision making i.e. his second face of power. 
All respondents express concerns about perceived democratic 
deficiencies within the LEPs structure contrary to the stated aim of 
improving accountability and decentralising power. There are 
certainly traits of path dependency evident within these reforms as, 
despite misgivings about both LEPs and City Regions, there is 
practically no opposition to them and a pervasive sense of 
inevitability exists around these reforms. All interviewees believe 
there is ongoing centralisation of power away from Leeds through 
administrative restructuring by successive governments. As Seddon 
64
 points out, elements of financial control are to be devolved under 
administrative reforms but statutory instruments are paramount in 
allocation of spending areas.  
64. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
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Thus, Central Government increases its ideological control over 
local government under the guise of decentralisation, demonstrating 
third dimensional power. This devolution of financial control will be 
further discussed in the chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 
Financial Devolution 
 
Introduction 
This chapter analyses the financial aspects of devolution within the 
Northern Powerhouse agenda. Firstly, the paramount spending 
scheme of the Conservative Governments devolutionary and 
regenerative agenda will be examined. Around £50 billion is 
earmarked for the High Speed 2 (HS2) project which will terminate 
in Leeds and further funding is posited for an upgrade of the 
East/West line, known as High Speed 3 (HS3). Local elite interviews 
suggest HS2 is broadly unwelcome and reasons for this will be 
examined.  
Further analysis will be presented in respect of the effects of such 
large scale infrastructure projects on power dynamics, in addition to 
regeneration outcomes. The emphasis will be on examining 
developments, through the prism of Lukes’ three dimensions of 
power, between local and national politicians and also how neo-
liberalism is advanced through private finance’s involvement in 
these projects. The proposed, but questionable, regeneration 
benefits will be examined utilising Banister and Thurstain-Goodwins 
(2014) three criteria theory of macro, meso and micro effects. I will 
additionally examine the competence of local and national 
governments to execute large scale infrastructure projects using the 
premises proposed by Docherty (2009) and Kuinersma, Arts and 
van de Zeuwen (2012). 
Secondly this chapter will examine tax and spending reforms from 
central government, classed as part of the devolving of power under 
the Northern Powerhouse agenda. Changes to Council Tax and its 
capping, along with the reduction in the redistributive element of 
business rates will be examined, concentrating on the effect these 
reforms bring to the power dynamic between various actors. The 
imposition of statutory limitations on local authority spending and the 
increased strictures around potential new funding will illustrate 
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discussions around a perception of imposed centralism at odds with 
the government’s rhetoric of increased localism. As these 
impositions suggest an extension of neo-liberal hegemony within 
local government, this theory will be explored through primary data 
collected from local elites. Additionally third dimensional power as 
described by Lukes (1974; 2005) will be used to analyse financial 
decisions and their effect on devolution of power in addition to the 
perceived limited input local politicians have in this project. 
Transport Infrastructure Investment  
Transport infrastructure investment, particularly High Speed 2 
(HS2), is arguably the chief financial totem of the Northern 
Powerhouse agenda and thus an area where perceptions from 
interview data appears particularly salient for this research. When 
examined through Robinsons (2010) ‘five R’s’ model, in which 
investment is measured against reconstruction, revitalisation, 
renewal, redevelopment and regeneration only one interviewee 
suggested a property led regeneration for the HS2 project. Although 
Robinson believes this type of publicly funded and directed 
regeneration had now ceased, Salveson does refer to HS2 as a 
‘property led scheme’ 65 with the aim of ‘regenerating run-down parts 
of Leeds’ 66. He states however that though regeneration is a worthy 
goal, £50 billion is too much to invest ‘just around regenerating a bit 
of Leeds’ 67.  
There are comparisons here with the re-generation of East 
Manchester under the New Labour Government, where many 
residents benefited but additionally ‘capital, particularly in the form of 
property development companies, also benefited’ (Blakeley and 
Evans, 2013, p.191).  
65. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
66. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
67. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
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Additionally, referencing the post-financial crisis situation they find, 
‘public spending is unable to compensate for the departure of 
property companies in investing in development’ (Blakeley and 
Evans, 2013, p. 34). No other primary data collected points to the 
narrow regeneration agenda within Leeds mentioned by Salveson 
68, suggesting that Robinson’s belief in a cessation of public sector 
funded and directed regeneration for specific economically troubled 
areas has traction.   
Salveson and Leigh, who are arguably best-placed to comment on 
transport investment owing to their knowledge of, and involvement 
in this area, critique the siting of the new Leeds High Speed Station. 
The main concern is that the new HS terminus will be some distance 
from the existing Leeds Station and therefore reduces connectivity 
between new and existing rail lines. Leigh blames this lack of 
connectivity on a belief that the link to Leeds was an ‘afterthought’ 69 
to the original London-Birmingham-Manchester proposal. This 
suggests a further fear for Leigh that if the project were to implement 
future cost cuts the first reduction ‘would be the bit that goes to 
Leeds’ 70. There is additionally a belief that the site was chosen for 
its availability and low price (Burt, 2014) rather than it being the best 
location, which gives some support to the regeneration theory of 
Robinson (2010).  
The notion that HS2 has been poorly planned and is of dubious 
value to Northern Powerhouse cities such as Leeds is commonplace 
among respondents (Adams; Golton; Seddon; Salveson and Leigh). 
Even those who are broadly supportive of the concept are critical of 
large aspects of its evolution.  
68. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
69. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
70. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
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Carter, perhaps the schemes biggest supporter, believes the biggest 
problem is that ‘it’s not been sold properly to the vast majority of the 
population’ 71 further indicating little public support for the project. 
Without support from local elites, or the public, it appears that the 
imposition of this national rail project through the Northern 
Powerhouse concept is consistent with an ideologically derived 
model being imposed within local transport infrastructure by national 
government, with limited opposition indicating third dimensional 
power. This perception, allied with other interview data on 
administrative devolution (City Regions, LEPs), and added to 
political devolution discussed in the next chapter, suggests this 
ideological face of power is implicit throughout the Northern 
Powerhouse agenda 
There is evidence demonstrating a reduction in local/regional power 
to allocate transport investment, as data shows this to be led and 
planned by central government in conjunction with private finance. 
None of the interview data shows local politicians or third sector 
groups having any significant input into the HS2 scheme. However, 
Docherty’s (2009) theory that local and regional governments no 
longer have the capacity or power to plan large scale projects of this 
kind offers support to the concept of Kuinersma et al (2012) that 
only national government has the power to plan these large scale 
projects. Golton points out, however, that despite HS2 being 
marketed as a Northern Powerhouse project, ‘it’s not. HS2 is a 
national rail project’ 72. This argument finds support from Carter who 
states that current thinking on HS2 is ‘underlining the benefit to the 
entire rail system’ 73. 
71. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
72. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
73. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
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The dichotomy between a belief that local government should have 
greater control over the project allied with a belief that only national 
government is capable of such planning and execution appears 
unresolved among local elites. There is additional evidence of third 
dimensional power here as, although there is no enthusiasm for the 
HS2 project among local elites, there is an acceptance that it will 
happen, suggesting acquiescence to the ideological underpinnings 
of the project despite widespread resentment of its imposition and 
execution.  
The cost/benefit analysis (CBA) around HS2 is equally unclear with 
concerns expressed by the elites interviewed for this project. In 
comparison with the regeneration of East Manchester there is 
perceived to be little potential for local benefits within Leeds 
whereas the Metrolink tram services created in Manchester were 
considered ‘fundamental to maximise investments, attract and retain 
residents and business’ (Blakely and Evans, 2013 p.61). Golton, for 
example, believes HS2 to be too much of a long-term project to be 
practical and therefore not fulfilling the need to ‘ramp up economic 
investment’ 74 in the Leeds City Region.  
Several respondents (Salveson; Adams; Golton & Leigh) worry 
about the potentially escalating cost, with Carter expressing the 
belief that it is ‘very likely to escalate further’ 75. This perhaps has 
echoes of the pioneering PFI-funded Royal Armouries Museum 
(RAM) in Leeds where costs rose and income was less than 
expected resulting in the private companies behind it having to be 
bailed out by Central Government. 
74. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
75. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
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This suggests the covert conflict postulated by Bachrach and Baratz 
(1962) and specifically Lukes (1974; 2005), as ultimate power 
appears to be controlled by central government at the expense of 
local politicians or even private finance. Consequently, the status 
quo arrangements would continue, with central government 
potentially underwriting the risks taken by private finance and acting 
as an enabler for the non-decision making dynamic which maintains 
the hegemonic economic structures of major projects pioneered by 
the RAM. 
The need for investment in a scheme that shortens journey times 
marginally between Leeds and London is also questioned. Adams 
feels the reduction in travel times between Leeds and London is 
negated ‘if it takes an hour to get from Bradford to Leeds’ 76. 
Salveson further describes how HS2 becomes potentially 
‘disconnected from the rest of the network’ 77 due to its lack of 
integration and Seddon speaks of a ‘lack of connectivity through the 
North’ 78 which isn’t helped by HS2’s stand- alone structure.  
The biggest critic of HS2 however is Steven Leigh who is particularly 
critical that under current HS2 plans, ‘those trains are going into 
those cities and stopping’ 79 as the terminus status of both Leeds 
and Manchester mean that passengers have to then transfer to 
current stations rather than making these North/South lines connect 
through existing or new East/West stations. This lack of connectivity 
suggests that HS2 would fail Bolden and Harmans (2013) third 
criterion for a successful investment i.e. good connectivity with 
current local services, as discussed in the Literature Review. 
76. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
77. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
78. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
79. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
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Indeed Leigh is very sceptical of the whole genesis and planning of 
HS2 believing that politicians have been sold a design by the 
company behind HS2 without much thought being given to the 
concept or economics behind it. 
But the fact is that most of the politicians, and we 
deal with lots of politicians all the time, they have to 
absorb huge amounts of information on all sorts of 
things. They are trusting the people at HS2 to have 
presented them with an optimum design for a 
railway because they don’t know the detail, they 
don’t have the benefit of having it explained to them 
and so they believe in it and when the party whips 
come and say we’re gonna [sic] go for high-speed 
rail, it’s become blurred. High-speed rail doesn’t 
necessarily mean HS2. High-speed rail is a concept. 
HS2 is a specific design. 
(Leigh, 2015)  
This suggests it is the market that is leading the pursuit of a 
North/South high speed rail link and that Central Government has 
become more of an enabling mechanism to allow private companies 
to build this scheme, as noted by Harloe (1995) and Allen (2001). 
However as Golton argues, national government ‘see the Northern 
Provinces as an opportunity to enable them to deliver their priorities 
from the centre’ 80 suggesting that Hastings (1996) and Preston 
(2012) are more accurate in describing the trajectory of power away 
from the regions towards the centre particularly under what they 
describe as  neoliberal policies.  
Thus, as private finance increasingly moves into local public sector 
structures through national government’s legislation and ideological 
direction, local politicians lose influence and private companies 
become increasingly powerful.  
80. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
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There is a consequent increase in the power of the centre and 
particularly private finance at the expense of local authorities. This 
ideological bias towards private finance is indicative of the neo-
liberalism element within the Northern Powerhouse and of third 
dimensional power as grudging acceptance of such ideology 
appears common amongst local elites.  
Primary data collected from elite interviews shows that while HS2 is 
viewed sceptically, an improved Trans-Pennine service, the putative 
HS3, has support across the political spectrum. There may be 
elements here of resistance to the imposition of HS2 as the 
paramount transport infrastructure investment component of the 
Northern Powerhouse. There is certainly, however, a consensus 
that such a local scheme would fit the three cost benefit impact 
levels proposed by Banister & Thurstain-Goodwin (2014). In macro 
terms Carter and Adams, political opposites, talk of the potential for 
HS3 to help improve economic growth across the Leeds City Region 
by aiding the movement of goods 81 and the workforce 82. On a 
meso-level, Leigh is very supportive of the potential for attracting 
businesses and populations through investment stating ‘you ask 
businesses across the North and regional and trans-Pennine 
communication, the Northern Powerhouse communications, are far 
more important than North/South’ 83. He believes that this type of 
investment helps attract business to the area which allied to the 
ability of workers to travel more easily potentially leads to the 
increased agglomeration described by Coombes et al (2008). The 
micro effect on land and property close to infrastructure is alluded to 
by Salveson in his comment about ‘regenerating run-down parts of 
Leeds’ 84 and echoes Blakeley and Evans’ (2013) work on East 
Manchester’s regeneration. 
81. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
82. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
83. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
84. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
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All respondents discussed the poor quality of the existing East/West 
infrastructure and its negative effects on economic growth for the 
Leeds City Region and the wider Northern Powerhouse. Indeed 
recent data published by the Centre for Cities showed public 
transport use in Leeds falling by 1.52% between 2001 and 
2011(Centre for Cities, 2016) demonstrating the disillusionment with 
local networks mentioned by several participants. Golton and 
Salveson additionally mention the ‘pause’ to investments following 
the 2015 election with Golton sceptical about the ‘unpausing’ that 
followed, stating:    
 
They’ve been talking about electrification of the line 
for quite a long time. That got delayed as soon as 
the government came in again, or rather it was 
paused. Then they said, oh it’s back on track but 
they haven’t actually brought it back on track in 
terms of giving a date for deliverability. 
(Golton, 2015) 
There is then a suggestion that central government has ultimate 
control over infrastructure investment in the region thus contradicting 
their rhetoric of devolving spending to the Northern Powerhouse. 
Any attempt at an ideological move to extend central power and 
further neo-liberal hegemony into regional transport structures does 
seem to be increasingly questioned by local elites although how 
much support exists for this critique from the general population is 
unclear and beyond the scope of the current project.  
Kuinersma et al (2012) discuss how fragmentation of regional 
structures makes planning major projects increasingly difficult but 
also view this fragmentation making regional opposition to major 
projects more difficult too. This potential is perhaps indicative of an 
emergent resistance to the imposed hegemonic neo-liberal position, 
which remains latent currently, but is beginning to find expression. 
There appears further potential for political devolution, as currently 
proposed through the City Mayor model, to allow this latent 
opposition to become more overt, although there is no suggestion 
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this is part of central government plans. This possibility will be 
further outlined in chapter 4.     
Regarding the environmental element of Banister & Thurstain-
Goodwin’s (2011) cost benefit analysis tests, HS3 certainly appears 
a more productive model, as expressed by Carter and Salveson. 
The criteria that most concerns elites within this research however is 
the ability of integration within the regional rail transport network to 
bring about economic benefits for the Leeds city Region. Golton 
includes broader integration aims for transport stating:  
if you covered the rail infrastructure which connects 
Leeds and Manchester and ultimately the two ports 
as well  then you sort of cover your issues around 
airports as well because that means that 
Manchester airport is even more accessible to the 
entire North of England as opposed to just the 
North-West. 
(Golton, 2015) 
Box, who has considerable influence as chairman of the West 
Yorkshire Combined Authority, states that ‘what we’re gonna [sic] do 
is to make sure that there’s connectivity right across the North’ 85. 
This aim is supported by Salveson who argues that it’s necessary to 
be ‘really looking at getting much better connectivity between the 
cities and large towns of the North of England’ 86. The 
interconnectivity that primary data shows interviewees most wanting, 
supports Docherty’s (2009) theory that region wide strategic 
transport plans produce the best economic and re-generational 
results for regions and cities. 
Docherty’s (2009) further criticism of UK regional transport in 
comparison with continental Europe finds support among some of 
the local elites interviewed for this project.  
85. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
86. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
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Salveson in particular draws comparisons with Germany which has 
a similar fragmented system of railway ownership but believes that 
this can be overcome, ‘you can do it with different operators if you’ve 
got some sort of coordination between them, which can only come 
from national government’ 87. Leigh 88 also makes critical 
comparisons with high speed rail in Europe and argues for greater 
strategic planning in large scale infrastructure projects.  
There is support within some sections of local elites for a halt of the 
state to market drift described by Allen (2001) and a desire within 
some sectors to see greater centralisation of planning of major 
projects as noticed by Hastings (1996) and Preston (2012). 
However, as the neo-liberal agenda of privatised transport structures 
appears currently unchallenged there appears to be little prospect of 
imminent change. Further, the lack of planning capacity within local 
authorities provides support for the notion of ‘hollowing out’ of local 
government as described by Rhodes (1994) and further explored by 
Ayres and Stafford (2011) and Rees and Lord (2014), as previously 
discussed in the literature review.  
There also appears to be evidence of Lukes’ third face of power in 
which local elites, whilst critical and sceptical of the merits of HS2, 
have accepted the agenda of high speed rail infrastructure 
investment as a valid regenerative project for the Leeds City Region. 
Even those with doubts about the planning or costs of the scheme, 
(Leigh; Salveson; Adams; Golton), give the impression of yielding to 
the non-decision making power exercised by central government 
through tacit acceptance of high speed rail schemes. Elements of 
ideological power are additionally displayed by the potential for 
private finance to be further manoeuvred into public regeneration 
projects.  
87. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
88. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
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This business-centred approach is further evidenced by Leigh who 
worries that HS2 needs to be more egalitarian than currently 
planned ‘so that not just business on an expensive ticket can use it 
but the masses can use it too’ 89. This signifies an element within a 
continuing shift in power from local government towards central 
government, but also a broadening of power held by private finance. 
Tax and Spend - Local Finances 
Interview data demonstrates that financial devolution is considered 
vital in any genuine devolution of power. Box states that ‘we want 
fiscal devolution because without it you don’t have devolution’ 90 and 
Salveson argues ‘unless you’ve got control over your own resources 
any talk of local or regional autonomy rings very hollow’ 91. The 
austerity measures that have been part of central government 
spending decisions have contrarily led to financial decision making 
becoming limited. Golton states:  
that’s why fiscal responsibility is key to actually 
achieving any kind of, not just accountability but 
credibility. And I’m not just talking about the general 
population, I’m talking about the business 
community as well  
(Golton, 2015) 
Increasing austerity imposed on local government, allied to an 
extension of contracting out services, as mentioned by Adams 92, 
plus a perception from local elites of a lack of tangible devolution of 
power appears to fit Davies’ (2004) theory of destructive tension 
being created between business and political power brokers.  
89. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
90. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
91. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
92. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
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Whilst appearing to offer greater devolved financial power through 
the Northern Powerhouse model, it appears that increasing 
conditionality around spending options and reduced central funding 
actually reduce the power of regional governments, such as the 
Leeds City Region. In his revised version of Power: A Radical View 
(2005) Lukes’ expanded definition of power includes ‘power to’ as 
well as ‘power over’ and it is this revised definition that is perhaps 
most salient in this instance. By reducing the options for local 
authorities to spend in certain areas and legislating for further 
privatisation of public services the ‘power to’ Lukes describes is 
significantly reduced by central government, to the benefit of private 
finance. 
The chief element in the devolutionary package in financial terms is 
perceived to be the City Deals model. These deals have been 
promoted as offering increased funding and devolved spending 
powers by the Conservative Government and George Osborne, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, in particular. Giovannini describes how 
in its application for a City Deal, Leeds views itself as ‘an ‘economic 
powerhouse’ in its own right, with dynamic urban and rural areas, a 
coherent geography, a self-contained labour market and existing 
synergies between its cities’ (Giovannini, 2016), creating an 
impression of a confident City Region in negotiations.  
Interviews with local elite actors, however, indicate significant 
distrust and opposition to these deals. Part of the deal is a promise 
of £30 million extra in finance provided by central government to city 
regions such as Leeds but this is viewed as inadequate. Adams 
talks of how Leeds City Council has ‘lost over 50% of its budget’ 93 
and Seddon  describes how the money gained is ‘less than the 
money that’s gonna [sic] be cut out of the budgets of those local 
authorities in the comprehensive spending review’ 94.  
93. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
94. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
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This paradox of an initial reduction in funding followed by a promise 
of further money if City Deals are reached appears indicative of 
Lukes’ theory of uneasy acquiescence, in which local financial 
autonomy is imposed by the centre. The most strident opposition to 
the proposed funding comes from Peter Box who states: 
The amount Osborne’s given us in terms of the 
regional growth fund equates exactly to the amount 
he’s taken off us in local government. So he’s 
robbing local government to give to the private 
sector to say there you are, you’ve got the money to 
be able to do things. It’s sleight of hand.  
(Box, 2015) 
There are two interviewees who are broadly, if conditionally, 
supportive of the City Deals. Firstly Andrew Carter believes the 
reduction in central funding ‘underlines the need to progress as fast 
as possible with the Northern powerhouse project’ 95. Secondly 
Steven Leigh who believes regional authorities need to take the 
money while it’s on offer as ‘it’s a moveable feast, politics’ 96 and the 
£30 million on offer could be withdrawn. There appears to be 
consensus among participants that the model is centrally driven, and 
for those on the left particularly, ideologically constraining. 
There are beginnings of a shift in Lukes’ second face of power, the 
non-decision making element, visible within the data collected. 
Adams 97 talks of how the local authority in Sheffield are considering 
taking some services back in-house and there is support from all 
respondents for a more redistributive form of financing whereby 
wealthier areas, or those with larger business rates incomes, 
contribute  to subsidising poorer areas. 
95. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
96. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
97. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
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This potentially indicates an emergent opposition developing among 
local elites, indicative of a nascent opposition towards the 
dominance of the neo-liberal paradigm within local authority 
financing.  
Previously these opposing opinions had been diminishing and the 
privatisation of local public services and creation of markets had 
become the hegemonic model, but there does appear to be 
increasing divergence from this within Leeds City Region elites. This 
may be an unintended consequence of the devolutionary process 
which could bring benefits to the political left and its desire to 
oppose the neo-liberal agenda. National government appears not to 
have considered the possibility of a potential for opposing the 
hegemonic economic position being created and this, unexpectedly, 
could benefit those with conflicting opinions. However, there are also 
indications of an acceptance that the Northern Powerhouse and its 
model of City Deals is currently the only option available and must 
be reluctantly engaged with.  
Third dimensional power does appear evident from the primary data 
collected for this project as new money promised as part of the City 
Deals is conditional on requirements that display elements of the 
ideological face of power. Golton outlines how ‘anything to do with 
local finance is regulated from the centre. Ideologically’ 98 and 
Seddon talks of how funding is increasingly earmarked, and for local 
authorities ‘there are legal obligations of them and what they can 
spend their money on’ 99.  
This expanding stricture around spending options is indicative of an 
attempt to further the ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism as 
local authorities are increasingly legally obliged to follow a 
privatising and pro-business agenda. There is also the imposition of 
City Mayors as part of the City Deal process which will be examined 
more fully in the next chapter, but Leigh 100 worries that once a 
98. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
99. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
100. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
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deal is done for an elected City Mayor that funding streams 
promised as part of this deal may be stopped. Some participants 
expressed regret that Leeds has not yet reached a deal unlike other 
Northern Powerhouse cities, such as Manchester in particular which 
is perceived to be leading the proposed devolutionary agenda. 
Respondents were asked to comment on the concept of an 
increased devolution of tax raising powers to local authorities and 
their answers fell into two categories. Firstly there was analysis 
around existing local authority revenue raising systems, particularly 
Council Tax and Business Rates. The big worry amongst local elites 
about developments in Council Tax was the issue of capping by 
central government and the central government domination implied 
by this. Andrew Carter believes that ‘on domestic rates the cap 
should be removed and council’s should be required then to justify 
to their electors, as the National Government has to, what it’s doing’ 
101
. Other participants share this concern with two of them (Golton 
and Seddon) mentioning the current rule that to increase Council 
Tax by more than 2% local government would have to hold a 
referendum. Golton is particularly critical as: 
 A referendum costs a whole loada [sic] money. For 
a government which talks about trying to cut red 
tape and bureaucracy, to actually ask for a 
referendum at each point that you actually want to 
do what you’re meant to do as a democratic 
representative, which is to make a deal with the 
population 
(Golton, 2015) 
This imposition of tax raising restrictions certainly suggests a shift to 
what Golton calls an ‘anticentrifugal thing which means that 
everything actually spins towards the centre as opposed to spins 
out’ 102.  
101. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
102. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
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This appears inimical to devolution of financial power and instead 
suggests increasing attempts by central government to embed its 
austerity agenda within local authority taxation frameworks. In turn, 
this is redolent of third dimensional power, as local government is 
required to conduct cost-cutting measures they don’t support, but 
are powerless to resist because of central government legislation 
and the hegemony of an austerity agenda. 
Allowing local authorities to retain increased percentages of the 
business rates collected informs the debate about the potential 
imposition of further neo-liberal ideology into local government 
finances. Primary data collected for this project shows local elites 
are worried by potential outcomes of this change. Adams points out 
that flourishing regions with successful business communities will 
fare better than more deprived areas, thus ‘Somewhere like Leeds 
might do quite well but if you look at Barnsley or Bradford…(less so)’ 
103
. The previous redistributive element between local authorities for 
business rates was praised by all participants, including 
representatives of business interests. Leigh states his support as it 
helps areas with little industry or business bases - ‘Northern 
Powerhouse places, indeed particularly if it’s just West Yorkshire’ 
104. Seddon supports this view and regrets that the ‘Coalition 
government changed the funding formula for local authorities so that 
deprivation was much less taken into account’ 105. Central 
government has portrayed these moves as an attempt to give more 
financial independence to local authorities by lessening the 
imposition of central funding formulas but the general consensus 
among interviewees is that Northern Powerhouse cities will suffer as 
 
103. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
104. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
105. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
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‘you’ve got an incredibly strong economy in London and the south 
east with a much weaker economy in the North’ 106.  
The move away from redistribution of business taxation between 
authorities is redolent of the neoliberal competition for funding 
described by Gonzalez and Ooosterlynk (2014) and part of a move 
towards increased competition between City Regions as noted by 
Waite et al (2013). This competitive element also emerged from 
primary data with Adams 107 noting the potential for businesses to be 
able to exploit the situation by perpetually moving their base to 
whichever local authority offers the most attractive business rates. 
Consequently businesses have potentially less investment in cities 
with the prospect of cities facing bankruptcy as their business base 
becomes increasingly temporary. By increasing the competitive 
element between City Regions and reducing the redistributive 
component of the business rate system local governments have 
reduced power to make financial decisions. This further implies an 
ideologically neo-liberal structure being instituted within ostensibly 
devolutionary schemes indicative of third dimensional power. Cities 
within the Northern Powerhouse, such as Leeds, are influenced to 
support a less redistributive system of business rates despite the 
potential for outcomes opposed to its own, City Region wide, self- 
interest.   
Leeds and the Financial Crash 2008 
For Gonzalez and Oosterlynk the financial crash of 2008 and its 
effect on Leeds led to a contiguous process of neo-liberal ideology 
being imposed on Northern Powerhouse cities. Although expanding 
under the New Labour Government (Wilkinson, 2007) this appears 
to have escalated under the following Coalition and Conservative 
Governments.  
106. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
107. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
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Data collected from Leeds elite actors strongly suggests that, 
despite its status as the ‘financial capital’ 108 of the Northern 
Powerhouse, Leeds did not suffer commensurately. Salveson states 
that he ‘didn’t get the impression that Leeds suffered 
disproportionally as a city’ 109. Carter agrees, stating ‘we’ve suffered 
in recessions, of course we have, but in my lifetime we’ve tended to 
be hit less hard and recovered more quickly. And that’s certainly 
what’s borne out now’ 110.  
The consensus from interview data is that unlike some other 
Northern towns and cities Leeds, despite its large financial sector, 
maintained a ‘broad base’ 111. Leigh compares Leeds broad 
economic base, which still has a substantial financial services 
industry, with ‘a place like Halifax where one employer is half, you 
know, if Lloyds Bank pull out of Halifax they’re in big trouble. 
They’ve got a skewed sort of distribution of types of business’ 112. 
Thus, while Halifax has become dependent on one large financial 
sector business Leeds’ business sector contains greater diversity. 
113
 also makes the point that much of Leeds’ banking sector is in 
‘day-to-day banking services’ 114 as opposed to the international 
finance that experienced the greatest difficulties in 2008. Adams 
however notes that while those employees working in financial 
services were able to absorb wage freezes and reduced hours it 
was those ‘people at the bottom who got made unemployed’ 115 and 
suffered the most from the economic crash. 
108. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
109. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
110. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
111. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
112. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
113. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
114. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
115. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
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Conclusion 
Foreman-Peck and Lungu (2009) and Rummery and Greener (2012) 
both make the argument that financial devolution is essential to any 
serious devolvement of power and this is supported by much of the 
data collected for this project. One of the chief drivers of the 
Northern Powerhouse paradigm is transport infrastructure 
investment and this investment is intended as part of a regenerative 
programme for Leeds City Region. There are contrasting opinions of 
the two main projects, HS2 and HS3, within this putative investment. 
The HS2 concept was unpopular amongst interviewees with little 
credence given to its ability to help regenerate Leeds and fears that 
it was a national rail plan sold as a regional infrastructure investment 
imposed by central government with the support of private finance. 
Only Salveson 116 mentioned any regenerative possibilities and then 
only for the area immediately surrounding the new HS2 station. This 
location however has been criticised by other interviewees due to its 
distance from the current Leeds station and consequent lack of 
connectivity to the existing local network. 
There is a belief among some respondents, mainly on the left, that 
business interests i.e. landowners and financial backers of the 
scheme, have strongly influenced the location. Leigh 117 additionally 
intimates that the process is driven by private finance with central 
government essentially acting as an enabling force. Doubts are also 
expressed by local elite interviewees about HS2s ability to attract 
economic investment to the region. This suggests that financial and 
ideological considerations are strong drivers of the HS2 project, 
indicative of Lukes’ third dimension of power whereby local 
authorities are nominally supportive of a scheme which diminishes 
their own power. This indicates a model in which the powerful 
transform the powerless in such a way that the latter behave as the 
former wish, without coercion or forcible constraint, in this case 
through hegemonic financial structures and criteria within a  
116. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
117. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
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transport infrastructure investment framework. 
Data collected for this project suggests that the putative HS3 trans-
Pennine route is considered a more viable option as local elites 
believe there is a strong need for an updated East/West rail link. 
However as HS2 currently is the favoured option this supports the 
view of national projects taking priority, thereby undermining the 
Northern Powerhouse devolutionary concept. Local elite opposition 
to HS2 demonstrates overt conflict as decision making by central 
government is contested by local actors. There does though appear 
to be an acceptance of the agenda setting by central government, 
allied with private finance, in respect of transport infrastructure 
investment which is indicative of the latent conflict inherent in the 
second face of power. The increasing involvement of private 
finance, supported by a neo-liberal Conservative Government, 
further hints at underlying ideological power being imposed on local 
government finances and structures.  
This suggests evidence of third dimensional power, whereby, unlike 
in the second face of power, there is no actual conflict and power is 
used insidiously by preventing conflict initially arising. Neo-
liberalism, although a contested term (Mudge, 2008), has ‘in short, 
become hegemonic as a mode of discourse, and has pervasive 
effects on ways of thought and political-economic practices’ (Harvey, 
2006, p.145) leaving alternative funding paradigms or structural 
models as broadly inconceivable. 
Devolution of tax and spend powers is deemed vital by interviewees 
for genuine power devolution to occur but it is considered by local 
elites that austerity measures negatively impact on this. As local 
services are increasingly contracted out 118, through government 
legislation, power is shifting away from local politicians towards 
private finance.  
118. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
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This is indicative of an ideologically driven power shift whereby the 
Northern Powerhouse model is represented as devolving financial 
power to city regions like Leeds but through increasing conditionality 
appears to be centralising financial decision making agendas.  
There is some evidence from primary data of a nascent challenge to 
the hegemonic position of privatisation which has created the covert 
conflict apparent between liberalisation and democracy noted by 
both Ruane (2010) and Foreman-Peck and Lungu (2009). As 
restrictions on spending levels and spheres imposed by central 
government increase, this impacts on financial options available to 
democratically elected local politicians, arguably impinging on their 
democratic mandate by limiting their power. This is potentially 
further eroded by the contracting out process in which power over 
spending plans is restricted by central government to the benefit of 
private finance. This paradox of central government rhetoric of 
devolving power whilst legislating for local government political and 
financial structures, thus extending central control becomes 
apparent through this project.    
Central government legislation allowing local authorities to keep 
more of the business rates they raise generates differing opinions. 
While the prospect is viewed as potentially positive for Leeds with its 
broad and relatively successful base of businesses, doubts are 
expressed about the outcome for areas with greater levels of 
deprivation and narrower business bases within the wider Leeds 
City Region. The reduction in the national redistributive element of 
business rates allied to the increasing market driven element 
intrinsic to City Deals points to an expansion of neo-liberalism within 
local governments’ financial structures as described by Gonzalez 
and Oosterlynk (2014) and Davies (2002). There is a belief that 
potential for collectivist action by Northern Powerhouse cities is 
diminished, suggesting a further shift in power away from local 
authorities to central government. 
The consensus among interviewees is that Leeds emerged from the 
2008 financial crash relatively well considering its position as the 
financial capital of the Northern Powerhouse. There are still areas of 
deprivation and parts of inner-city Leeds, particularly south of the 
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River Aire, are considered in need of regeneration by local elites and 
contrasts are made with the perceived successful regeneration of 
East Manchester as described by Blakely and Evans (2013). The 
advent of HS2 and its new station in this location is portrayed as a 
regenerative project by its proponents but this claim is viewed 
sceptically by interviewees. There is a belief, expressed most 
strongly by Leigh 119, that HS2 is a project driven by the needs of 
private finance and underpinned by ideologically driven central 
government policy.  
Additionally City Deals which constrain local authority spending and 
further promote privatisation of formerly public services suggest the 
ideological power control indicative of Lukes’ third face of power 
particularly in respect of local authorities ‘power to’ control its own 
financial affairs. The consensus appears to be that regenerative 
aspects of transport infrastructure investment are impositions of 
central government in alliance with private finance providing further 
support to the idea of a neo-liberal agenda behind regenerative 
proposals. Paradoxically these centralising and privatising structures 
which reduce the power of local politicians are portrayed as 
devolving power and appear to be perceived that way by the public.  
This links to the next chapter which analyses aspects of political 
devolution and their effect on the power of local politicians. 
119. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
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Chapter 4 
Political Devolution 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will explore three areas within the political devolution 
debate drawing from primary research data and underpinned by 
academic theories. Firstly I will examine the perception of the 
balance of power between local and national government and the 
perceived trend in the development of this relationship towards 
centralisation. Secondly, there will be an examination of perhaps the 
most important element in the government’s political devolutionary 
agenda, City Mayors. The perceived imposition of this structure will 
be examined through classical theories of power, chiefly that of 
Lukes (2005) to explore how it affects power dynamics within elite 
structures and whether it is indicative of third dimensional power.  
Although a directly elected mayoral model was rejected in referenda 
in 2012, including in Leeds, the government has persisted with this 
model and the reasoning behind this will be examined. It has echoes 
of the Irish Nice and Lisbon Treaty referenda which were both lost 
but rerun to provide the desired result (Garry, 2012). As no rerun 
was considered necessary to introduce a democratically rejected 
structure, this suggests that central government feels powerful 
enough in comparison to local government, and indeed the general 
public, to impose their desired outcome.     
Thirdly I will explore the perception of local elites around public 
opinions of local politicians and other elite actors. This will give a 
useful perspective on distribution of power and the public consensus 
about the suitability of different levels of politicians to exercise this 
power. As local elites appear to believe that local politicians are 
more popular and trusted than national politicians the shift in power 
towards the centre becomes interesting for this research. The 
paradox is strongly evident as centralisation is occurring under the 
guise of decentralisation which the public is expected to endorse. 
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This paradox evidences ideological third dimensional power as 
described by Lukes (1974; 2005). 
 
Local/National Government- Balance of Power 
Gauging opinions of how devolutionary powers are perceived 
among local elites provides potentially crucial insights for this 
project. There is a general consensus, explored in the literature 
review, that political power should be distributed away from the 
centre (Nairn, 2000; Bradbury & Mitchell, 2002; Bradbury, 2006) 
which finds echoes within interview data. All participants support 
devolution of power, though there are differences about how best to 
achieve this and differences around how sincere national 
government is perceived to be in its devolutionary agenda. Blakeley 
and Evans describe how, ‘Despite the power of the central state in 
Britain, ministers in successive governments are keen to enunciate 
the rhetoric of localism’ (Blakeley and Evans, 2013, p.147). Paul 
Salveson echoes this, stating: 
There’s been a lot of rhetoric about localism from 
both this government and the previous Labour 
government. I think in reality there’s still very much a 
strong centralising tendency amongst Westminster 
politicians, they see that’s where real politics are. 
(Salveson, 2015) 
This suggest Rhodes’ (1996) concept of a hollowing out of local 
government whereby power is increasingly centralised and local 
government is left with little power or authority despite rhetoric from 
successive governments stating the opposite. There are additionally 
intimations in Salveson’s statement, of non-decision making power, 
i.e. a widely accepted agenda of devolution, being used rhetorically 
by central government whilst centralising policies become 
increasingly prevalent. There is a perception of a lack of legitimacy 
in centralising discourse, as noted by Seddon 120 meaning that  
120. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
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politicians need to appear to be following a decentralising agenda. 
This appears indicative of the agenda shaping, second face of 
power within Lukes’ theory, in which a centralising agenda appears 
to no longer be an option as national government intentionally 
excludes such models from discussions. 
There is, however, broad agreement from the interview data that the 
reality is an incremental centralising of power. Seddon 121 talks of 
reforms happening over the last ten years and particularly the last 
five, but others claim this consolidation trend stretches further back. 
Adams talks of a ‘reduction in power over the last probably thirty to 
forty years’ 122, Carter 123 describes a shift over the last 40 years and 
Golton believes there has been a greater concentration of central 
power ‘since around about the 1950’s’ 124. There is certainly no 
suggestion from any of the participants of a move in the opposite 
direction being apparent at any time in the recent past.  
This data suggests then that centralisation has happened under 
governments of all political shades, implying broad consensus on 
the issue at a national level. However this reduction in influence of 
local authorities is equally indicative of central governments 
increasing privatisation of local public services and the statutory 
contracting out paradigm discussed in the previous chapter 
(O’Leary, 1987; Bovaird, 2006; Foreman-Peck and Lungu, 2009). 
The reasons noted by respondents for this centralising shift and a 
posited hollowing out of local government vary, with elements of 
political affiliation apparent in their reasoning. 
121. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
122. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
123. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
124. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
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Carter for example blames ‘the activities of the extreme left in the 
middle ‘70s and the ‘80s when they sought to challenge the 
legitimate mandate of central government’ 125 believing this forced 
central governments, of differing political hues, to show authority 
and reduce the influence of this type of ‘confrontational politics’ 126 
through a continuing re-assertion of central control. Golton hints at a 
similar mistrust of the financial competence of local authorities as he 
notes that the tax raised locally in the UK, at around 5% is ‘the 
lowest rate in any OECD country’ 127. Leigh also talks of how the 
relationship has ‘been conditioned by finance’ 128 suggesting that the 
business community has less trust in local politicians (particularly 
those on the left who generally run Northern Powerhouse cities) to 
administer funding than it has in national government or perhaps the 
business community itself. There is perhaps then an aspiration from 
those on the political centre-right for centralisation of power as a 
means of further inculcating neo-liberal financial ideas and 
structures into previously left wing/collectivist, local authorities and 
distancing the left from local power structures. This is indicative of 
third dimensional power as there appears little meaningful 
resistance to the devolutionary agenda currently, although 
disagreement with it is certainly evident within interview data.  
On the left there seems to be little unanimity about the reasons 
behind centralisation of political power. There is agreement that the 
Labour Government (1997-2010) displayed equivalent centralising 
tendencies to previous and successor Conservative Governments 
129
.  
125. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
126. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
127. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
128. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
129. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
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Salveson describes how ‘under Blair there’s sort of quite well 
documented anecdotes about the contempt… that was felt towards 
local democracy’ 130. This is arguably evidenced by seeing ‘different 
political institutions dissolved, like the police committee, now run by 
police and crime commissioners’ 131, suggesting mistrust of local 
politicians from a broad political rank and a desire to loosen their 
power over agenda shaping in local government.  
Seddon 132 further points out the increasing use of statutory 
instruments to extend Westminster’s domination. This is indicative of 
an ideological element to this centralisation as these designations 
are largely centred on privatisation of procurement methods 
(Bovaird, 2006) or strictures around ‘spending priorities’ 133. This 
supports the idea of national governments, particularly but not 
exclusively those on the right, extending hegemonic economic 
models into local government political and administrative structures 
under the guise of decentralising power. As this process continued 
under the Labour Government it would suggest, however, that there 
is broad consensus on the efficacy of the model across the political 
spectrum. There are also intimations here of the ‘hollowing out’ 
concept, (Ayres and Stafford, 2011; Rees and Lord, 2013) in which 
the illusion of increased devolution of power masks the diminution of 
local political control and greater involvement of external actors, 
such as central government or private finance. 
A further interesting concept used to analyse this balance of power 
is the centre/periphery relationship within territorial politics as 
described by Bulpitt (1983) and Bradbury and Mitchell (2002).  
130.  Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
131. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
132. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
133. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
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The perceived success of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh 
Assembly appears to have created a devolutionary paradigm within 
UK politics across the political spectrum, as noted by Bradbury 
(2006) and mentioned by several interviewees, although Northern 
Ireland, which, due to its particular circumstances, has had a more 
problematic experience of devolution, unsurprisingly does not 
appear in this discourse.  
This devolutionary agenda is particularly desired by those on the 
left, suggesting that ideological thinking antithetical to national 
government economic policies is perhaps behind some of this 
opposition. The Independence Referendum in Scotland in 2014 is 
considered to have resulted in devolution within England being 
‘certainly pushed on the political agenda in a way it wasn’t before’ 
134. It appears to have created a desire for a ‘benign and inclusive’ 
(Nairn, 2000) regional level of government in Leeds. There is little 
unanimity however in the structures for this devolved power as 
pointed out by Golton, who believes that the people of Leeds 
‘haven’t actually got anything to rally around at the moment because 
the city region models don’t fit that’ 135.  
National politicians appear to have little respect with a perception of 
‘MPs being in the Westminster bubble, they haven’t really got a feel 
for what’s happening in their own towns and cities’ 136 leading to a 
further disconnect between national government and people in cities 
such as Leeds. So, while national politicians are seen as 
increasingly out of touch with local affairs, it is considered by local 
elites that they are extending their domination, contrary to stated 
aims. This dichotomy suggests elements of ideological control in the 
debate as voters appear to approve of devolution despite the shift 
towards greater centralisation, therefore public opinion is 
unsupportive of policy but produces no resistance to its 
implementation, revealing the third face of power which Lukes 
(1974; 2005) describes. 
134. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
135. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
136. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
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City Mayors 
Despite previous reservations (Hambleton, 2014) the 2010 
Conservative Party manifesto stated that: 
We have seen that a single municipal leader can 
inject dynamism and ambition into their 
communities. So, initially, we will give the citizens in 
each of England’s twelve largest cities the chance of 
having an elected mayor. Big decisions should be 
made by those who are democratically accountable, 
not by remote and costly quangos. 
(Conservative Party, 2010, p. 76). 
Primary data gathered from local elites suggests that considerable 
scepticism about the aims outlined in this manifesto statement 
exists. The subsequent defeat in nine out of eleven of the City 
Mayor 2012 ballots, including Leeds which voted against by 63.35% 
to 36.65% on a 30.48% turnout (Syal and Meikle, 2012) was 
certainly a major setback for the Coalition Governments plans and 
this is reflected by respondents (Seddon; Salveson). Perhaps the 
most strident opposition in this respect comes from Box who 
believes that the national government is attempting to introduce city 
mayors ‘by the back door’ 137 and ‘if it’s such a good idea have a 
referendum, and he daren’t’ 138, referring to the Prime Minister.  
As suggested previously, this noted rejection of democratic 
preference is indicative of third dimensional power in which central 
government feels able to proceed with its City Mayor agenda and 
disregard opposition to its reforms. Seddon echoes this, arguing 
‘having failed to get his model of governance in produce, by fair 
means, he’s now trying by foul means through the back-door of 
getting them in in a different way’ 139.  
137. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
138. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
139. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
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This suggested surreptitious introduction of a City Mayor provides 
echoes of an ideological power controlled by central government 
which local politicians, though disapproving, feel powerless to resist. 
Box further argues that a ‘strong collective leadership’ 140 is a more 
efficient and more valid means to execute power and is supportive 
of current local authority structures. Alternatively, Golton, although 
against the City Mayor model, is perhaps the chief opponent of the 
current system, claiming that ‘the combined authorities that are there 
at the moment don’t deliver’ 141. Despite antagonism towards an 
imposed City Mayor within elites, particularly on the left, little 
opposition to reforms from the public is apparent, despite the large 
majority voting against in the 2012 referenda. This pragmatic 
approach suggests Lukes view that ‘one can consent to power and 
resent the mode of its exercise’ (Lukes, 2005, p148). There is a 
broad perception from interviewees that local politicians are 
powerless to resist the City Mayor model, but some feeling that a 
City Mayor could have sufficient power to resist central governments 
strictures and power domination.      
Primary data suggests that local elites are worried about the lack of 
accountability potentially inherent in the City Mayor system as 
currently proposed. Adams talks of a ‘lack of credibility and there’s a 
lack of democratic accountability’ 142 and Carter, though a strong 
supporter of the scheme, believes there is a need for a ‘strong 
assembly beneath the elected mayor’ 143.  Interview data (Golton; 
Seddon; Salveson and Adams) suggests comparisons with the 
system in London, in which a relatively powerful Assembly exists to 
monitor and hold to account the Mayor, is viewed as desirable by 
local elites. 
140. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
141. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
142. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
143. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
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Golton states that there is a ‘need to create structures around a 
directly elected mayor that provide accountability and security’ 144. 
Carter and Leigh, both arguably supportive of Conservative Party 
policies believe that the current mayoral model in London works well 
and emphasise the need for democratic scrutiny from an elected 
assembly. Carter and Salveson, additionally support elections 
conducted under proportional representation, which is also hinted at 
by Adams and Seddon, with the aim of exercising of power 
becoming more representative and inclusive. The Conservative 
Party’s statement that ‘big decisions should be made by those who 
are democratically accountable’ (Conservative Party, 2010. p.76) 
and the current plans for City Mayors finds little support within 
primary data for this research project. This seemingly results in the 
imposition of a model which has very limited support from local elites 
and has additionally been previously rejected by the electorate in 
Leeds. 
There is a concern among some interviewees that the real outcome 
desired by the Conservative Government is furthering neo-liberal 
market orientated policies within local authority structures rather 
than increasing accountability. Golton, from a centrist position, 
describes: 
The government’s focus, although they talk about 
accountability… as being primarily to lessen political 
impact and increase business influence, so that’s 
why they’ve concentrated on the local economic 
partnership. And then on the accountability 
structures they concentrated on an elected mayor 
because, I’m assuming, that the intention is that it 
allows greater permeability into the political structure 
of a charismatic, potentially business-orientated 
figure like Donald Trump. 
(Golton, 2015) 
144. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
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The lack of democratic endorsement for the City Region and City 
Mayors model demonstrates the potentially destructive tension 
between business and democracy in which economic liberty is 
valued above democratic legitimacy (Davies, 2004). It further 
creates a dialectic contradiction between neo-liberal ideology around 
societal freedoms and the democratic narratives that devolution is 
intended to foster. Elements of Lukes’ third face of power appear 
evident here as the Leeds electorate are given the opportunity to 
vote in an elected City Mayor, a system which they have previously 
rejected in a referendum. By potentially investing control of local 
levers of power with political elites in an unsought, directly elected 
executive mayoral system the Conservative Government 
demonstrates the theory advocated by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) 
of a two dimensional power structure in which covert conflict is 
evidenced through the Government’s attempt to control the direction 
of power relationships while appearing to loosen this control. In 
addition, non-decision making is evidenced by the focus on City 
Regions as outlined in interviews with Golton, Adams and Salveson 
with other potential options ruled out.  
A devolved assembly, for Yorkshire for example, is perceived as 
unacceptable, indicative of the concept of covert decision making. 
Box argues that directly elected executive mayors are not a better 
solution to encourage economic growth locally and that ‘There is no 
evidence to show that having an elected mayor, London is an 
exception, makes any difference to results’ 145. This statement 
appears to have traction as analytical studies have included both 
objective and subjective indicators (Sundell and Lapuente, 2012) 
meaning results can only be relativist.  
Despite the claim in the Conservative Party Manifesto (2010) 
implying that the efficacy of City Mayors is apparent from the 
perceived success of the London Mayoralty there appears to be, as 
Box 146 states, no empirical evidence to support this claim.  
145. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
146. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
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This suggests then, as Lukes (2005) three dimensional view of 
power indicates, that the City Mayor paradigm is ideologically 
motivated, with the prime intention of loosening the power of local 
politicians and extending hegemonic neo-liberal economic 
frameworks into local governance. There appears to be little support 
within City Regions for the model and only the creation of a 
pervasive ideologically driven discourse makes the scheme appear 
consensual.  
A further criticism of the City Mayor model is the potentially 
questionable quality of people elected to the position. Worries are 
expressed, in interviews with Seddon and Adams, about the 
potential for extremists to gain power through these elections. This 
disquiet stems from the election of the English Democrat Mayor 
Peter Davies in Doncaster in 2009 on an anti-political establishment 
ticket. His disastrous handling of Council affairs, allied to the 
inadequacy of preceding administrations, resulted in a new Chief 
Executive being imposed by central government (Tingle, 2013).  
The imposition of officials would appear to undermine and 
delegitimise the devolutionary process, whilst compromising the 
authority of elected mayors in the public’s estimation. If the 
democratic choice of a town can be overridden by central 
government so easily this implies local power is something of an 
illusion, particularly when it comes into conflict with the centre. This 
provides further evidence of the third dimensional power in which 
central government creates an illusion of local power being 
strengthened whilst still retaining domination over other 
stakeholders.  
The other potential pitfall is the possibility of a joke candidate, such 
as Angus the Monkey in Hartlepool, being elected, as noted by 
Adams and Golton and, as Leigh argues, if a maverick is elected by 
the public ‘whether you like it or not, that’s democracy’ 147. The 
potential for extremist or joke candidates suggests that though 
perceptions exist of the City Mayor model as diminishing the power  
147. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
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of local politicians there is also the possibility of genuine resistance 
to all elites. This possibility appears to have been overlooked by 
local elite interviewees but has potential to provide innovative 
challenges to institutional power. 
Public Perceptions 
It is useful for this project to examine how local politicians are 
regarded by the public. Particularly so in line with changing the 
current system of local Councillors and a cabinet system of local 
government which the Conservative Manifesto described as ‘remote’ 
(Conservative Party, 2010). If this opinion of local politicians as 
‘remote’ is true then it helps explain the need for reforms and 
provides support for the concept of City Mayors to re-connect 
politicians with voters and to devolve power closer to the people. 
Interviewees for this project felt that this view was broadly untrue 
however, arguing that ‘there was more respect for elected officers, 
any level, anywhere forty years ago than there is today’ 148. Box 
argues that:  
I think they like us more than they like national 
politicians. Nobody likes politicians. The saving 
grace is that they like local politicians more than 
national ones. And the reason is obvious, that we 
are closer to people. We’re seen everyday. 
Westminster politicians are seen as remote and 
uncaring. 
(Box, 2015) 
This is echoed by Golton who believes local politicians are ‘valued 
higher than national politicians because they’re more visible’ 149. He 
emphasises that this means more visible to constituents rather than 
to the press. 
148. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
149. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
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It appears axiomatic that local politicians would have a positive 
opinion of the public perception of local politicians but there does 
seem to be support for this view among non-politicians interviewed 
for this research. Seddon and Adams both express the belief that 
local politicians are viewed favourably although Seddon argues that 
their standing has ‘diminished because the power of local authorities 
has diminished’ 150. Ben Harrison, writing about the recent election 
of Oldham Council leader Jim McMahon as an MP, contrarily argues 
for a renewed importance being given to local politics led by the City 
Mayor concept as, ‘while Jim McMahon chose to take the step from 
local to national politics last year, it is significant that Sadiq Khan 
and Zac Goldsmith are now vying to make the opposite journey and 
become Mayor of London’ (Harrison, 2016, p.5). This does suggest 
that the City Mayor model could be a way to re-invigorate local 
politics, although London should probably be seen as a global city 
(Sassen, 2000), and its mayor as a very high profile position to an 
extent that Leeds would not be.   
In Leeds itself, Carter argues that there is public appreciation for 
how successful the city is and that it is elected councillors ‘what’s 
driving the economic success of the city’ 151.There is broad 
agreement within interview data from Adams, Carter, Seddon, 
Golton and Box suggesting that there is an absence of grievance 
among the population about current local, political power structures. 
This appears indicative however of Lukes’ third dimension of power 
in which central driven policy reduces the domination of local 
politicians, against popular opinion, and increases the power of 
private finance underpinned by a neo-liberal ideology. Although the 
public perception of local politicians remains relatively positive, and 
that of business run former public services is broadly critical, there is 
little public or elite demand for change to this model suggesting 
public acquiescence to the dominant ideology. 
150. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
151. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
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Conclusion 
There appears to be general consensus among politicians nationally 
that devolution of political power is a desirable and positive 
aspiration. However, a belief that the national government’s 
devolutionary agenda is largely rhetorical becomes apparent from 
interview data indicating the latent conflict identified by Lukes (1974; 
2005)) whereby rhetorical methods are utilised to exclude 
centralising models from the debate around power relations. Despite 
this rhetoric of localism there is a belief among local elites that 
power has become increasingly centralised over a considerable time 
period. 
The reasons quoted for this upward shift in power vary within elite 
opinion. Carter 152, with support from Golton 153 and Leigh 154, 
believes that extreme policies introduced by leftist authorities in the 
past has led to a breakdown in trust between central and local 
government prompting the imposition of financial dominance through 
legislation, such as rate capping.  
There are indications from interview data that private finance, and 
neo-liberal imperatives, have been given preference over local 
political considerations, furthering the hegemony of these concepts.  
The political left, however, seems to be divided on reasons for this 
power shift. There is a belief that centralisation happened under the 
New Labour Government in addition to Conservative and Coalition 
administrations and some support is evident for ideological motives 
lying behind this perceived shift in power. This is arguably evidenced 
by the increased use of statutory instruments by national 
government 155 to extend financial control and arguably further neo-
liberal financial hegemony through the use of compulsory 
contracting out legislation.  
152. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
153. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
154, Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
155. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
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Although national politicians appear to be extending their domination 
over local government their popularity is perceived by the local elites 
to be lower than their own. This paradox shows evidence of the third 
dimension of power as the public have a low regard for national 
politicians and their policies but allow them to implement their 
programme with little apparent resistance. 
City Mayors constitute a substantial segment of the current 
devolutionary process and are believed by the current Government 
to have more democratic accountability. The paradox here is that a 
very similar model was rejected, in Leeds and other cities, in the 
referenda in 2012. There is a belief that the current system works 
relatively well across the political spectrum leading some of the 
interviewees to conclude, Box in particular, that the model is an 
attempt to reduce collectivist structures across the Northern 
Powerhouse and further neo-liberal business oriented policies. 
All interviewees expressed worries about the potential lack of 
accountability and oversight inherent in the City Mayor model and 
critical comparisons with the structure in London, where a relatively 
powerful Assembly exists to scrutinise the executive mayor, were 
drawn. The lack of scrutiny allied to the democratic rejection of the 
City Mayor model suggests that an ideological desire to reduce the 
power of local politicians in Northern Powerhouse cities such as 
Leeds, as suggested by Box 156 and Adams 157 does have some 
traction.  
Participants were additionally questioned about their beliefs on 
public perceptions of local politicians. There was broad agreement 
that local elected representatives were regarded relatively highly, 
though less so than previously and there is a belief that this decline 
is ongoing.  
156. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
157. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
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This decline in popularity could be attributed to the perceived 
reduction in power exercised by local politicians. Potentially if 
powers to local authorities were increased, perceptions of local 
politicians’ abilities would increase commensurately. 
However if current models within the Northern Powerhouse agenda 
result in further power being allocated to private finance, through 
contracting out legislation, this could further undermine confidence 
in local politicians and consequently see further reductions in their 
power being viewed as inevitable. Interview data suggests broad 
satisfaction with the performance of local authorities and a 
suggestion they are being reformed by less popular national 
politicians, with little public support.  
This appears to be happening for ostensibly ideological reasons 
indicative of the third face of power in which ideological power 
causes the general public to acquiesce in reforms which they do not 
support. As ideological changes are imposed from the centre 
against the wishes of the majority of local elites, and in spite of 
democratic mandates against proposed changes in the case of City 
Mayors, Lukes’ theory (1974; 2005) of a resentful acquiescence to 
the Northern Powerhouse concept and ideology appears salient. 
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Conclusion 
 
This project used primary data collected from semi-structured 
interviews with local elite actors and policy group representatives to 
examine perceptions of power relationships inherent in the Northern 
Powerhouse concept. These interviews were informed by scholarly 
research around classical theories of power, particularly the three 
dimensional view of power of Lukes in his Power: A Radical view 
(1974; 2005). Research concentrated on four areas essential to this 
study, with firstly an examination of the Northern Powerhouse 
concept itself, and perceptions of it with particular reference to 
Leeds. Following this was a study of power devolution in three 
important areas, administrative, financial and political. By utilising 
academic theory, allied with original data, a gap located in scholarly 
literature around the Northern Powerhouse concept is thereby 
addressed. 
The Northern Powerhouse is viewed by interviewees as an ill-
defined concept, created by George Osborne with perceived 
negative consequences for local authority power. Participants 
broadly support a devolutionary agenda but perceptions exist that 
the Northern Powerhouse concept is being imposed by central 
government with little input from local actors.  
As this imposition has met little resistance, there are indications of a 
reluctant acceptance of the model thus demonstrating Lukes’ third 
dimension of power. Participants suggest that the paramount drivers 
for the Northern Powerhouse agenda are economic with a re-
balancing of the national economy away from London. However, a 
number of interviewees believe that this financial impetus contains 
plans to move away from previous redistributive models of local 
finance towards a more competitive market -driven, neo-liberal 
model. This is evidenced by City Deals, which are perceived as 
introducing greater competition between, and within, City Regions 
and furthering moves away from previous collectivist principles. 
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Participants appear equally sceptical of Northern Powerhouse plans 
for devolving political power through City Mayors and two specific 
changes are viewed as necessary. Firstly, there is a perception that 
the model has been introduced against public opinion, following the 
failed referenda (2012), suggestive of Lukes’ concept of third 
dimensional power and its consequent acquiescence without 
consent. There are additional fears that statutory limitations around 
contracting out services allied to austerity measures have limited 
local financial control to the benefit of private business, which is 
indicative of a furthering of the neo-liberal hegemonic agenda.  
When asked for views on Leeds and its place in the broader world, 
comparisons with Manchester were frequently made. As Blakeley 
and Evans (2013) point out, East Manchester had a relatively 
successful regeneration project in the 1990s, linked to the 
Commonwealth Games Stadium, but there is a perception that 
Leeds has not had this type of concerted regeneration effort. As 
Manchester’s leadership also appears to be deeply involved in the 
Northern Powerhouse project, this further fuels the belief that Leeds 
has missed out on potential benefits of the devolution model. As 
competition between cities increases, it is felt that Leeds position 
has weakened comparatively and that central government’s neo-
liberal ideology is instrumental in this. Further, there is an associated 
belief, on the left particularly, that a return to collectivism amongst 
cities would be mutually beneficial, but unlikely under current 
Northern Powerhouse thinking. 
The City Region administrative reform suggests an imposition of 
deals designed to further market inflected ideology within local 
government. However, City Regions are broadly welcomed on 
economic terms as evidenced in interviews with Box, Carter and 
Leigh but with caveats around an imposed but barely questioned 
structural and administrative paradigm grounded in neo-liberal 
ideology. Salveson 158 demurs, however, believing City Regions to 
be artificial creations with political aims, and favours a Yorkshire 
Assembly, as more culturally and politically representative.  
158. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
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Overt and latent conflict, identified in classical power theories, are 
evidenced by a Conservative Government implementing 
devolutionary models on largely Labour - led local authorities in the 
Northern Powerhouse. Interviewees expressed worries about the 
perceived imposition of the Northern Powerhouse agenda, echoing 
O’Leary’s (1987) theory of ideology surpassing other considerations. 
A paradox (redolent of Lukes’ third face of power) is created 
whereby local authorities have notionally increased spending 
powers whilst accepting increased restrictions on spending options 
through statutory limitations impose by central government. There is 
hope on the left that combinations of left-led City Regions may 
contribute to opposing neo-liberal expansion within local 
government, an unintended consequence of administrative reforms. 
The replacement of RDAs with LEPs finds little support from 
interviewees as they are considered to represent narrower 
constituencies, with business given greater input (and power) and 
third sector actors, such as Trade Unions having diminished roles. 
There is a belief that RDAs were abolished with little thought given 
to potential successor agencies and that their abolition was 
instituted on political, or ideological, grounds rather than 
administrative. Further, as Doyle (2013) argues, economic 
centralisation appears significant to the creation of LEPs, extending 
the reach of private finance within local administrative structures. As 
these structures are reshaped there appears to be a growing 
ideological domination of local institutions and actors, indicative of 
pervasive central power.  
The extent to which administrative reforms are imposed by central 
government to further business influence in local spending and 
power is considered significant by interviewees. This arguably 
counteracts Stones’ (1974) argument that central government 
funding insulates local government from business control, as 
statutory spending conditions favouring private finance are imposed. 
As central government is seen to increase its domination over local 
government it provides increasing evidence of third dimensional 
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power as local government grudgingly accepts these centralising 
reforms.  
The principal financial investment under the Northern Powerhouse 
agenda is the proposed HS2 line from London to Manchester and 
Leeds. Doubts are expressed by interviewees around the 
regeneration potential of the project and the extent to which it is 
marketed as a Northern Powerhouse project when it is perceived in 
primary data as essentially a ‘national rail project’ 159. Regenerative 
prospects for transport infrastructure investment are considered 
more successful with local schemes such as Metrolink in East 
Manchester, as noted by Blakeley and Evans (2013). Suspicions are 
expressed by participants that the chief beneficiaries of HS2 may be 
private finance and property owners around the new station site. 
Doubts are also expressed over the stations siting by Salveson 160 
and Leigh 161  and its perceived lack of connectivity to current 
networks, thus failing Robinsons (2010) ‘five R’s’ model which 
stressed connectivity to optimise regeneration outcomes. As the 
project is planned and controlled centrally in conjunction with private 
capital, there are further reductions in the power held by local 
government as it has limited input into a major component of the 
devolution and regeneration agenda.  
Thus a dichotomy is created whereby participants believe local 
government should have greater control of infrastructure investment 
whilst accepting that only national government is capable of 
planning and executing such a major project. Although little local 
support is apparent for HS2 there is an acceptance of its inevitability 
evidencing, again, Lukes’ third face of power. There appears to be 
greater elite support for a putative Trans-Pennine route (HS3) which 
is considered to possess greater potential for regeneration in Leeds. 
159. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
160. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
161. Interview with S. Leigh, 09/12/2015 
 
 
  
97 
 
HS3 equally complies with the three cost benefit proposed by 
Bannister and Thurstain-Goodwin (2014) of macro, meso and micro 
level benefits. Whilst having ostensibly economic underpinnings this 
support for HS3 also suggests latent opposition to central 
government impositions indicative of the second face of power 
described by Lukes (2005). This non-decision making face is further 
indicated by the assumption that private finance leads the HS2 
project whilst public sector funding is considered off the agenda.  
Davies (2004) describes a creation of destructive tension between 
business and politicians and this potentially has traction within 
financial devolution. An austerity programme imposed centrally on 
local government allied to statutory contracting out appears to 
evidence this theory. Further, these financial impositions on local 
authorities allied to rhetoric of devolving power create a paradox 
whereby power is reduced under a devolutionary paradigm. There 
are potential changes to non-decision making power with Adams 162 
describing moves in Sheffield to locate services back in-house and 
broad support for a more redistributive financial arrangement among 
local elites suggesting potential nascent resistance to the 
hegemonic neo-liberalism. This may be viewed as an unintended 
resistance developing to loss of power through rhetorically 
devolutionary reforms. 
There are fears among local elites that reforms to business rates will 
negatively impact on local authority’s ability for regeneration and 
equally reduce their power through spending restrictions. As the 
redistributive element of business rates is reduced, furthering neo-
liberal competition for funding between Northern Powerhouse cities, 
beginnings of an opposition on the collectivist left appear to be 
emerging. However, as little resistance is currently visible this 
opposition is perhaps more indicative of the ideological control 
described by Lukes (2005), whereby local authorities resent 
ideological imposition but acquiesce to its implementation.  
162. Interview with B. Adams, 18/11/2015 
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Gonzalez and Oosterlynk (2014) believe neo-liberalism was 
increasingly imposed on Leeds following the 2008 Financial Crisis. 
However participants believe that Leeds, despite its large financial 
services sector, fared relatively well because it still retained a broad 
base 163 of businesses.       
Blakeley & Evans state that despite the power of the central state in 
Britain, ministers in successive governments are keen to enunciate 
the rhetoric of localism (Blakeley and Evans, 2013, p.147) and this 
sentiment finds support within interview data concerning Leeds. All 
participants identify a centralising tendency existing over an 
extended period of time and under different governments. Rhetorical 
localism is identified in the interviews of Golton, Salveson and 
Seddon combined with centralising actions to create a non-decision 
making paradigm whereby a devolutionary theme disguises power 
consolidation whilst centralising rhetoric is excluded from discourse. 
There is little consensus around the political causes of this 
perceived centralising agenda. There are indications that the 
political right view increased central government control as a means 
to loosen the power of the left in Northern Powerhouse cities. 
However, it is believed that the New Labour Government displayed 
similar consolidating tendencies, with suggestions from Salveson 164 
and Golton 165 of analogous mistrust between left-led local 
authorities and the Labour Government. A perceived increase of 
power for private finance is also apparent from primary data. 
Seddon 166 endorses Bovaird’s (2006) idea of centralisation being 
evidenced through extending privatisation of procurement formulas 
and statutory contracting out of formerly public services.  
163. Interview with A. Carter, 17/11/2015 
164. Interview with P. Salveson, 16/11/2015 
165. Interview with S. Golton, 19/11/2015 
 166. Interview with V. Seddon, 12/11/2015 
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Local politicians, however, are perceived by participants as having 
greater public respect than national politicians. This creates a 
paradoxical situation in which popular local politicians face gradual 
erosion of their power, whilst unpopular national politicians extend 
their domination despite rhetoric to the contrary. As this paradox 
deepens, it faces little resistance and becomes grudgingly accepted 
by the public, thereby demonstrating third dimensional power. 
Perhaps the most explicit example of Lukes’ third face of power 
within the devolutionary agenda is the City Mayor model. Despite a 
failed referendum in 2012, national government has pushed ahead 
with the implementation of City Mayors, meeting little public 
resistance despite their democratic rejection. Little support among 
interviewees for City Mayors is evident with a perception on the left 
that they are a ‘Trojan Horse’ to loosen Labour’s domination of 
Northern Powerhouse cities. Allied to the competitive nature of City 
Deals, there are indications of attempts to lessen collectivist opinion 
and promote private financial power and market mechanisms within 
local authorities. Paradoxically, despite opposition to City Mayors on 
the left, there are suggestions that the position may provide enough 
power for an incumbent to resist the domination of central 
government.   
Worries are expressed around the lack of democratic accountability 
attached to City Mayors by interviewees seemingly opposed to 
central governments stated aim that ‘big decisions should be 
democratically accountable’ (Conservative Party, 2010, p.6). A 
common belief amongst interviewees is of the need for an elected 
assembly, preferably elected under a proportional voting system, to 
scrutinise City Mayors, similar to the London model.  Box  is 
particularly scathing of the efficacy of the City Mayor model arguing 
there is ‘no evidence’ 167 they improve economic outcomes or 
regeneration goals. Indeed as there is additional potential for 
extremist or joke candidates to be elected, this undermines the 
potential standing of the model. 
167. Interview with P. Box, 04/12/2015 
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Paradoxically, worries expressed around such candidates and the 
outcome of such an election result suggests power is invested in the 
City Mayor position to facilitate such concerns. The potential for 
overt and covert conflict in addition to ideological conflict and power 
domination is evident throughout primary data as is the reluctant 
acquiescence from the public. As Lukes’ states ‘one can consent to 
power and resent the mode of its exercise (Lukes, 2005, p. 176). 
Even though local politicians recognise the negative outcomes 
inherent in some of the Northern Powerhouse devolutionary agenda, 
they feel it is practically impossible for them to resist, demonstrating 
the overarching rationale of third dimensional power.         
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